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Abstract
This thesis presents research conducted for the security aspects of correlated sources
across a wiretap network. Correlated sources are present in communication systems
where protocols ensure that there is some predetermined information for sources to
transmit. Systems that contain correlated sources are for example broadcast channels,
smart grid systems, wireless sensor networks and social media networks. In these systems
there exist common information between the nodes in a network, which gives rise to
security risks as common information can be determined about more than one source.
In this work the security aspects of correlated sources are investigated. Correlated source
coding in terms of the Slepian-Wolf theorem is investigated to determine the amount of
information leakage for various correlated source models. The perfect secrecy approach
developed by Shannon has also been incorporated as a security approach. In order to
explore these security aspects the techniques employed range from typical sequences used
to prove Slepian-Wolf’s theorem to coding methods incorporating matrix partitions for
correlated sources.
A generalized correlated source model is presented and the procedure to determine the
information leakage is initially illustrated using this model. A novel scenario for two
correlated sources across a channel with eavesdroppers is also investigated. It is a ba-
sic model catering for the correlated source applications that have been detailed. The
information leakage quantification is provided, where bounds specify the quantity of in-
formation leaked for various cases of eavesdropped channel information. The required
transmission rates for perfect secrecy when some channel information has been wire-
tapped is further determined, followed by a method to reduce the key length required
for perfect secrecy. The implementation thereafter provided shows how the informa-
tion leakage is determined practically. In the same way using the information leakage
quantification, Shannon’s cipher system approach and practical implementation a novel
two correlated source model where channel information and some source data symbols
(predetermined information) are wiretapped is investigated. The adversary in this sit-
uation has access to more information than if a link is wiretapped only and can thus
determine more about a particular source. This scenario caters for an application where
the eavesdropper has access to some predetermined information. The security aspects
and coding implementation have further been developed for a novel correlated source
model with a heterogeneous encoding method. The model caters for situations where a
wiretapper is able to easily access a particular source.
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The interesting link between information theory and coding theory is explored for the
novel models presented in this research. A matrix partition method is utilized and the
information leakage for various cases of wiretapped syndromes are presented.
The research explores the security for correlated sources in the presence of wiretappers.
Both the information leakage and Shannon’s cipher system approach are used to achieve
these security aspects. The implementation shows the practicality of using these security
aspects in communications systems. The research contained herein is significant as
evident from the various applications it may be used for and to the author’s knowledge
is novel.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The introduction addresses the field of security in communication networks, gives an
overview of the objective of the thesis, includes an outline of the thesis and provides a
list of publications for this research project. The field of research is broadly introduced
here to provide a holistic view of the importance and significance of this research as
there are many applications for which it can be used. The thesis objectives cover the
aim of the thesis and hypothesis, and the thesis outline describes the chapters that lie
ahead. The list of publications lists the papers published, submitted and that are to be
submitted for this research project, which also provides an indication that this research
is indeed significant.
This document is a PhD thesis for research in the field of telecommunications. The
research focuses on the security aspects of correlated sources across a wiretap network.
The field is largely information theory based, however in the latter part of this work
there is an interesting link highlighted between information theory and coding theory.
The problem statement, concepts, methodologies and solutions that the research has
focused on is provided herein.
Practical communication systems make use of correlated sources. The communication
nodes adhere to certain protocols and this means that certain information (e.g. date,
area, etc.) in the header files will be the same for various nodes. From the receiver’s (or
an eavesdropper’s) perspective, it appears as common information shared between the
nodes. This is therefore pre-existing or known information for an eavesdropper. Thus,
correlated sources are common in systems transmitting information, e.g. smart grid
1
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meter systems, wireless sensor networks and broadcast channels. This implies that the
theory used for correlated sources may also be applied to this type of system. These
networks can use the methodologies described in this research to secure the system or
to determine the information leakage.
The research focuses on two and more correlated sources that transmit information
to a receiver. This system is useful for wireless architectures. In wireless networks,
physical links connecting nodes to one another are not present and the transmission
medium is air. These networks have a security risk as the transmitted information
may easily be intercepted. Wireless networks have thus in recent decades gained much
exposure. Mobility, a result of wireless communications, supports productivity in a
workplace because users are able to access information wherever wireless communication
is available and can thus work while moving around [8]. Working while traveling increases
worker productivity [8], which is favourable for businesses. Wireless communication has
applications in many systems for example mobile cellular phones, WLANs (Wireless
local access networks), satellite systems and wireless ad hoc networks. Hoebekeet et al.
[9] maintain that the cellular phone is the strongest motivator for the increase in wireless
communications. WLANs host a local access network, which support high speed data
transmission [10]. Satellite communication makes it possible to have voice transmission
from remote areas (for example journalists reporting live from a remote war zone) [10].
In wireless ad hoc networks wireless mobile nodes self-configure and form a network
without any established infrastructure [10].
Wireless technology has been chosen for the research; this well-established technology
has been chosen because of the vast range of applications for which it may be used. It is
noted that each of these applications mentioned may have correlated sources depending
on the communication protocols. Further applications for wirelesss communications
are in embedded computing applications (where embedded devices communicate in a
wireless manner with one another) and emergency services (informing authorities of
an emergency so the necessary aid can be dispatched). If the protocol has common
information (e.g. the date, time or location in a header file) then the transmitter will
receive information correlated with other nodes/sources. It is also important to note
that correlation is generalized in the sense that no correlation means zero correlation,
hence this research also caters for many other communication scenarios.
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An interesting wireless application is smart grids. The application is mentioned to show
the potential of the research topic, however the scope of the research project is not lim-
ited to this single application. It is a type of electrical grid that functions to predict
and intelligently respond to the behaviour of the users connected to it [11]. It is capa-
ble of making the conventional grid work more efficiently, securely and reliably through
bidirectional flows of power and communication [12]. The two-way communication may
be implemented using AMR (automatic meter reading), where the smart meter is an
important component. Xia and Wang [12] define a smart meter as a device that usually
has a processing chip and a non-volatile storage so that it can perform smart functions;
for example being able to report periodic usage updates to the end-users and the gen-
eration facilities at the power company, and interact directly with smart appliances at
home to control them. The information received by the end users may have correlated
information depending on where the meters are located or what time the information
was sent. It could also be related to the communication protocols to which the meters
adhere.
Other applications for this work are broadcast channels and social media networks. In
broadcast channels there is one sender and multiple receivers, for example satellite sys-
tems. Social media networks transmit information internationally in the form of images,
video, voice and text. For both these applications there may be common information
transmitted via the network. With the existence of common information, the sources
are thus correlated and the principles that apply to correlated sources can also apply to
these systems.
Correlated sources have the ability to decrease the bandwidth required to transmit and
receive messages. A syndrome (compressed form of the original message) is transmitted
instead of the original message. It is also interesting that this correlated source approach
has the ability to provide a more secure communication system. The research focuses
on the security aspect in an eavesdropped network that makes use of correlated sources.
Correlated sources possess a security risk as common information provides information
about more than one source. Correlated source coding is the method that has come
about to reduce this security issue. A compressed message has more information per
bit, and therefore has a higher entropy because the transmitted information is more
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unpredictable. The unpredictability of the compressed message is also beneficial for the
information security.
One of the security aspects focused on is the amount of information leakaed to an
eavesdropper. The information leakage that has been considered is not that associated
with cryptography, as discussed by Sun and Rane [13] but rather that associated with
information theory. The scheme incorporating information leakage by Sun and Rane
[13] deals with allowing for some information to be leaked such that the receiver is able
to retrieve the original message even if it has been corrupted. The leaked information
(which satisfies a lower bound so that it does not compromise the system) serves the
purpose of making the system more secure, and it is related to the field of cryptography.
Thus, one aspect of the information leakage that this research deals with is that where
certain transmitted bits are analysed to determine how much of information about the
source message has been retrieved.
The other security aspect investigated is providing perfect secrecy through the use of
the Shannon cipher system approach. Shannon’s secrecy model is an interesting avenue
for this work. Merhav [14] investigated similarly, for a model using the additional pa-
rameters of the distortion of the source reconstruction at the legitimate receiver, the
bandwidth expansion factor of the coded channels, and the average transmission cost.
In this research, Shannon’s cipher system approach is used to indicate bounds for trans-
mission and key rates to achieve perfect secrecy.
Considering the applications that have been put forth, these correlated sources may be
prone to information leakage in the presence of an eavesdropper. In order to practically
determine the amount of information that an eavesdropper has access to an analysis of
the information leakage for various encoding methods is presented herein. The practical
analysis makes use of coding theory techniques to show how the information leakage is
quantified.
A source message is passed through an encoder before it is transmitted across a channel.
There are various encoding methods that exist; for example encryption, error correction,
compression, message transmission in plaintext. In this work, the encoding method that
has been explored is compression and transmitting messages in plaintext. The network
compression is achieved through use of the Slepian-Wolf coding method. Chapters 4 and
5 employ this encoding scheme for use in systems where an eavesdropper has access to
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channel information only and where the eavesdropper has access to channel information
and some source data symbols (i.e. some predetermined information) respectively. Since
there is a single encoding method this can be described as homogeneous. In Chapter
6, network compression and the plaintext transmission of messages are used to cater
for a scenario where an eavesdropper has easy access to a source. Since there are two
encoding methods used, it can be described as a heterogeneous method.
This research incorporates these encoding methods for correlated sources across wire-
tapped links in order to determine and minimize the information leakage for such a
scenario and to provide a Shannon cipher approach for perfect secrecy. Initially, a gen-
eralized case for multiple correlated sources is considered followed by specialized cases,
which employ the concept of a multiple-access channel. These are networks that consist
of one receiver and two or more sources (as defined by Cover and Thomas [4]). The
wiretap network is characterized when an eavesdropper is present in this multiple-access
channel, with noiseless conditions.
1.1 Objective of Research
The hypothesis for this research is as follows: A generalized model for correlated sources
and a wiretap network will be developed. The purpose of the generalized model is
to quantify the information leakage for this communication scenario. Furthermore, a
masking method will be proposed to minimize/reduce the information leakage of the
proposed model. Therefore, the major contribution is to develop the generalized model
for this specific communication scenario and the minor contribution is to develop a
method to minimize the information leakage for the generalized model.
In this work, the novel aspect covers a generalized model for multiple correlated sources
that transmit messages to a single receiver followed by three specific novel scenarios in
which the information leakage is quantified. Further, the Shannon cipher approach has
been presented for the specific scenarios, which explores the security aspect further. The
research is indeed significant and this can be gathered from the applications for which
this research may be used.
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1.2 Outline of Thesis
The thesis begins with a view of the methodologies and tools used and thereafter the
various models that have been developed are considered. The first chapter is an intro-
duction that introduces the research field, topic and the thesis structure. The list of
publications pertaining to this research are thereafter presented.
In Chapter 2, the background of this research project and where this research fits into
the sphere of information theory and coding theory is described. Related work and
examples are described to give a further understanding of the significance of the re-
search. The literature survey is comprehensive in detailing similar work that has been
done. Investigations conducted in security for correlated sources, Slepian-Wolf coding
and wiretap channels have been detailed. Coding schemes that relate to the field of
information theory are introduced in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, the various methodologies and techniques that have been used in this
research are described. These techniques include Slepian-Wolf’s theorem, typical se-
quences, wiretap channels, Hamming weights, Shannon’s cipher system approach and a
matrix partition method for coding implementation. The fundamental aspects that are
used to prove the Slepain-Wolf theorem are discussed to present this important theorem.
Methods used to determine the equivocation of a source are also presented here. The
coding implementation aspect describes the methodology used to provide a link between
the fields of information theory and coding theory.
In Chapter 4, the multiple correlated source model and a two correlated source model
are developed. Here, multiple correlated sources across a wiretap network is initially
described in terms of the information leakage and thereafter in terms of Shannon’s cipher
system where transmission rates for perfect secrecy are developed. The information
leakage is quantified using traditional information theory concepts of entropy and mutual
information. The two correlated source model is also analyzed in the same way. In order
to show the link with coding theory an implementation to determine the equivocation
is done using a matrix partition method.
In Chapter 5, the focus is on a more specific two correlated source scenario to quantify
the information leakage and to provide the Shannon cipher system approach. Here,
the sources are split into two partitions and certain source symbols and syndromes are
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wiretapped. The information leakage is quantified for this model and Shannon’s cipher
system used to determine the transmission rates for perfect secrecy. As with the previous
chapter this chapter ends with the matrix partition implementation for the model.
In Chapter 6, the information leakage for a correlated source model with heterogeneous
encoding in which an eavesdropper has easy access to one source is considered. As before
the information leakage is quantified and the model is thereafter analyzed in terms of
Shannon’s cipher system, followed by the coding implementation.
To the best of the author’s knowledge these models described in Chapter 4-6 are novel
and their information leakage characterization unique.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. The future work for this research and a list of contribu-
tions have also been provided.
1.3 List of Publications
This section lists the publications for this research project, the submitted research papers
and the papers to be submitted based on this research. The sections or chapters of the
thesis that contain the content of these papers have been indicated.
The following is a list of publications for this research project:
1) R Balmahoon and L Cheng, “Bandwidth Reduction using Correlated Source Compres-
sion for Smart Grid Meters with Feedback” in Proceedings of Southern Africa Telecom-
munication Networks and Applications Conference, Port Elizabeth, South Africa, Au-
gust 30 – September 3, 2014.
2) R Balmahoon, H Vinck and L Cheng, “Information Leakage for Correlated Sources
with Compromised Source Symbols over Wiretap Channel II” in 52nd Annual Allerton
Conference on Communication, Control and Computing, Monticello, USA, October 1 –
October 3, 2014. (Detailed in Section 5.1)
3) R Balmahoon and L Cheng, “Information Leakage of Heterogeneous Encoded Cor-
related Sequences over an Eavesdropped Channel” IEEE International Symposium on
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Information Theory, Hong Kong, China, 14-19 June, 2015. (Detailed in Section 6.1 and
Section 6.3)
The following is a list of journal papers to be submitted for this research project:
1) R Balmahoon and L Cheng, “Information Leakage of Correlated Source Coded Se-
quences over a Channel with an Eavesdropper” to submit to IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory. (revised version for re-submission) (Detailed in Chapter 4)
2) R Balmahoon and L Cheng, “Information Leakage for Two Correlated Sources with
Partially Predetermined Information” to submit to IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory. (Detailed in Chapter 5)
This chapter has introduced the research project field and identified the importance of
such a project. The hypothesis and aim of the research has been provided to clarify
the research project goal. The thesis has been outlined to give an indication of the
arrangement of the presentation for this research project. The publications have also
been listed here.
Chapter 2
Background
The literature survey or background related to the research project is presented in this
chapter. Initially the significant and novel work documented by Shannon that led to the
introduction of the field of information theory is detailed. This forms the basis for the
information theory aspects discussed further into the thesis. The concept of correlated
sources forms an important aspect as all the novel models developed in this research
consist of correlated sources. One of the security aspects analyzed is the Shannon cipher
system approach; related literature is detailed in this chapter. The models also contain a
wiretapper, and this chapter incorporates the research conducted in wiretapped networks
to compare the similarity to the models developed during this research project. The
coding implementation for wiretap networks has been researched and the related work
is presented here. This forms a basis for bridging the gap between coding theory and
information theory.
Communication systems enable us to transmit information from a source to a receiver.
Here, a general communication system that is depicted in Figure 2.1, which laid the
foundation for information theory and was introduced by Shannon [15] is shown.
This model by Shannon introduced the components involved in communication when
transmitting digital information (i.e. the information is transmitted as a stream of 0’s
and 1’s) from a source to a receiver. The transmitter is responsible for converting the
message into a suitable form for the particular communication architecture. Thereafter,
the receiver estimates the correct message and sends the information to the destination.
9
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Information source
Transmitter
Noise source
signal received signal
Receiver
Destination
Figure 2.1: Diagram showing general point-to-point communication system [1]
While the information is transmitted it could encounter noise, which results in the
received signal looking different to the transmitted signal.
To provide an analogy for transmitting and receiving information, an example described
by Yeung [1] of a secretary sending a fax (i.e. trying to convey information from one
point to another by fitting as much information as possible on a sheet of paper) is used.
The page could have large fonts or smaller fonts to try to squeeze more characters on
the page, however the page has a finite resolution so if the font is made too small it
may not be readable by the receiver and also there may be noise through transmission
resulting in incorrect characters appearing at the receiver. Even though some characters
are not recognizable the receiver may still be able to determine the information on the
page based on the context. This brings on the idea of finding the maximum amount
of information that can fit on one page while the receiver can accurately determine
the information at the receiver. The concept described here illustrates a fundamental
question about communication systems.
The channel coding theorem was also presented in the work by Shannon [15], which
formed the basis for correlated source coding. Here the entropy is used to characterize
the minimum rate such that the source produces messages that are error free, hence the
entropy has been termed by Cover and Thomas [4] as the ultimate data compression.
The channel coding theorem was another result from this important paper by Shannon
[15].
The important concept of uncertainty (known as the entropy) was introduced in the
paper by Shannon [15] as pointed out by Yeung [1]; it shows that information is naturally
random and probability distributions are used to develop the theory of information.
There are various information measures that are developed from the entropy (and are
explained in greater detail in Chapter 3) for two sources.
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2.1 Correlated Sources
2.1.1 Correlated Source Compression
The Slepian-Wolf code has been defined by Lu et al. [16] as a code that uses incremental
transmission of coded bits to achieve multiple coding rates. It is built on using typical
set encoding and decoding, which has been described in Chapter 3. Slepian-Wolf [17], in
1973 initially described coding for correlated sources such that the Slepain-Wolf bound is
achieved, which ahowed the use of Slepian-Wolf codes for correlated sources. Thereafter,
there have been many applications of Slepain-Wolf codes. Two such examples are the
use of streaming codes, where the Slepian-Wolf bound is met for streaming data that
incorporates a random binning procedure [18] and the use of Slepian-Wolf codes for
storing fingerprint biometrics [19].
In work by Prabhakaran et al. [20] the rate regions for Slepian-Wolf have been analyzed
for a secrecy model where there is an eavesdropper present. For the models presented
herein the Slepian-Wolf theorem is employed to ensure accurate reconstruction of the
transmitted message at the receiver.
According to Wolf and Kurkoski [21], an important aspect of the Slepian-Wolf theorem
is that the encoders can achieve better compression rates by exploiting the correlation
in the transmitted data streams. The result is that Slepian-Wolf coding can achieve the
same compression rate as an optimal single encoder that has all correlated data streams
as inputs [21]. Thereafter, Slepian-Wolf coding has also been used in applications for
security [22][16], showing that security is indeed a concern. In the research contained
herein, security aspects are also explored, different to that already done as the informa-
tion leakage across links is quantified and minimized. The correlated source approach
contributes to information leakage as a source is able to provide common information
for every other source with which it is correlated. Correlated source coding, which in-
corporates the Slepian-Wolf theorem is a method to alleviate this issue as compressed
forms of the original messages are transmitted.
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2.1.2 Side Information and Multiple Correlated Sources
Any extra information that the eavesdropper has access to can be considered as side
information to assist with decoding. This side information can be viewed as a separate
source and when the side information is correlated then it can be generalized to represent
a correlated source. Villard et al. [23] have explored this side information concept further
where security using side information at the receiver and eavesdropper is investigated.
Side information is generally used to assist the decoder to determine the transmitted
message. An earlier work involving side information was done by Yang et al. [2]. In
Chapter 5, a specific model is introduced where there are data symbols transmitted
directly to the receiver; this is considered as correlated side information.
The common side information concept is extended when there are common random keys
available at the sender and the receiver. This is correlated side information available at
the terminals and has been investigated by Ahlswede and Csiszar [24].
In work done by Johnson et al. [25] the field of side information and compressed in-
formation was investigated. Side information was thereafter looked at by Villard and
Piantanida [26]: A source sends information to the receiver and an eavesdropper has
access to information correlated to the source, which is used as side information. There
is a second encoder that sends a compressed version of its own correlation observation of
the source privately to the receiver. Here, the authors show that the use of correlation
decreases the required communication rate and increases secrecy.
There has been work done by Maurer [27] that describes security aspects for common
information between multiple sources. This work entails building a cryptographic system
that satisfies perfect secrecy conditions with a key that has an entropy less than the
message entropy.
2.1.3 Feedback Applications
To show that correlated sources exist in a range of models, it is noted that correlated
sources have been implemented with feedback. Correlated sources with feedback are
investigated by Yang et al. [2] for the case of one and two encoders, as depicted in
Figure 2.2 and 2.3.
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The scheme proposes a block coding algorithm for the case in Figure 2.2. It is proven
that:
c→ H(X|Y ) (2.1)
X0X1X2X3.... X0X1X2X3....
Y0Y1Y2Y3....
Encoder Decoder
Figure 2.2: Feedback source network with one encoder [2]
X0X1X2X3.....
Y0Y1Y2Y3.....
(X0Y0)(X1Y1)(X2Y2)(X3Y3).....
Encoder 1
Encoder 2
Decoder
Figure 2.3: Feedback source network with two encoders [2]
where c is the compression rate (i.e the number of bits transmitted from the encoder to
the decoder) and H(X|Y ) is the conditional entropy of the source X given Y , both of
which are correlated. The authors also prove that the feedback rate approaches zero as
the number of transmissions become very large. For Figure 2.3 the same analysis results
are extended and the authors present a universal decoding algorithm for a feedback
scenario. More recently, Yang et al. [2] also considered feedback and presented a model
that uses typical set encoding and decoding to achieve the Slepian-Wolf bound for a
feedback scenario.
2.1.4 Security and Other Applications
The use of correlated sources has various applications, for example the field of network
coding (which is the use of coded data blocks during communication). Ho et al. [28] in-
troduced network coding for correlated sources. Thereafter, the flow of information that
incorporated multiple correlated sources was investigated by Barros and Servetto [29].
Other interesting work then dealt with the extraction of correlations between sources,
such that the joint distributions may be determined [30]. A few years later, building on
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the extraction of correlation was work by Bogdanov and Mossel [31], where common bits
are extracted without communication occurring. Thereafter some importance is placed
on the work conducted by Prasad et al. [32] where the use of correlated sources is made
for security needs. Here, the compression ability for correlated sources is exploited.
This research contained herein also used the compression ability for correlated sources
to provide security.
Dai et al. [33] point out that their correlated source approach can be used as an ap-
plication in broadcast channels. Since we present fundamental research for correlated
sources, it may be used with these applications as well. Research prior to Dai et al.
[33] that incorporate Slepian-Wolf coding and broadcast channels as an application are
those by Ahlswede and Korner [34] and Grokop et al. [35]. A network incorporating
wiretappers that access noisy information can be called a wiretap channel. A detailed
explanation of these channels is contained in Chapter 3. Villard and Piantanida [26]
have looked at correlated sources and wiretap networks. In their work, there is a second
encoder that sends a compressed version of its own correlated observation of the source
privately to the receiver. Here, the authors show that the use of correlation decreases
the required communication rate and increases secrecy.
Villard et al. [23] explore this side information concept further where security using
side information at the receiver and eavesdropper is investigated. Side information is
generally used to assist the decoder to determine the transmitted message. An earlier
work involving side information is that by Yang et al. [2]. The concept can be consid-
ered to be generalised in that the side information could represent a source. It is an
interesting problem when one source is more important and Hayashi and Yamamoto [36]
consider it in another scheme, where only X is secure against wiretappers and Y must
be transmitted to a legitimate receiver. They develop a security criterion based on the
number of correct guesses of a wiretapper to retrieve a message. In an extension of the
Shannon cipher system, Yamamoto [37] investigated the secret sharing communication
system.
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2.2 Shannon’s Cipher System and Wiretap Channels
2.2.1 Shannon’s Cipher System
Keeping information secure has become a major concern with the advancement in tech-
nology. This research incorporates some traditional ideas surrounding cryptography,
namely Shannon’s cipher system and adversarial attackers in the form of eavesdroppers.
In cryptographic systems, there is usually a message in plaintext that needs to be sent
to a receiver. In order to secure it, the plaintext is encrypted so as to prevent eavesdrop-
pers from reading its contents, and is termed the ciphertext. Shannon’s cipher system
(mentioned by Yamamoto [5]) incorporates this idea. Apart from the Shannon cipher
system, there is another well known cipher model i.e. the secret sharing communication
system described by Yamamoto [38], which is an extension of Shannon’s cipher system.
The definition of Shannon’s cipher system has been discussed by Hanawal and Sundare-
san [39]. In Yamamoto’s [5] development on this model, a correlated source approach
is introduced. This gives an interesting view of the problem, and is depicted in Fig-
ure 2.4. Correlated source coding incorporates the lossless compression of two or more
correlated data streams. Correlated sources have the ability to decrease the bandwidth
required to transmit and receive messages because a syndrome (compressed form of the
original message) is sent across the communication links instead of the original message.
A compressed message has more information per bit, and therefore has a higher entropy
because the transmitted information is more unpredictable. The unpredictability of the
compressed message is also beneficial in terms of securing the information.
Encoder Decoder
X,Y W
Wiretapper
Wk
Key Generator
Source
Xˆ, Yˆ
Figure 2.4: Yamamoto’s development of the Shannon Cipher System
With reference to Figure 2.4, the source sends information for the correlated sources, X
and Y along the main transmission channel. A key Wk, is produced and used by the
encoder when producing the ciphertext. The wiretapper has access to the transmitted
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codeword, W . The decoded codewords are represented by X̂ and Ŷ . In Yamamoto’s
scheme the security level was also focused on and found to be 1KH(X
K , Y K |W ) (i.e. the
joint entropy of X and Y given W , where K is the length of X and Y ) when X and Y
have equal importance. This is in accordance with traditional Shannon systems where
the security is measured by the equivocation. When one source is more important than
the other then the security level is measured by the pair of the individual uncertainties
( 1KH(X
K |W ), 1KH(Y K |W )). An investigation into the rate distortion theory has been
conducted in more recent research by Yamamoto [40]. This research project also incor-
porates Shannon’s cipher system to determine the transmission rate for perfect secrecy
for two or more correlated sources that transmit information to a receiver via separate
links.
2.2.2 Wiretap Channels and Wiretap Channel II
Whether many links are considered or a single link as Yamamoto [5] had, there may
be a wiretapper present that can access information across the link/s. The signals are
more susceptible to eavesdropping in wireless networks compared to the traditional wired
networks, as it is easier to attack the former. Other concerns in wireless communication
are path loss, interference and fading. Being able to keep messages secure and user
identities private thus becomes a concern. Furthermore, since eavesdropping is a major
security risk in wireless networks, it is in the interest of producing a secure system to
ensure that there is as less information as possible leaked to an eavesdropper. In work by
Aggarwal et al. [41] active eavesdroppers are described. These eavesdroppers are able to
erase/modify wiretapped bits. They develop a perfect secrecy model for this scenario.
The eavesdropper investigated in the work contained herein is a passive wiretapper, who
cannot modify information.
Since AMR (automatic meter reading) is an application of wireless networks, it has
the same concerns as that mentioned for wireless networks, namely eavesdropping. A
wiretap network is generally one that allows for eavesdropping across a noisy channel.
Wiretap networks have been presented by Cai and Yeung [42] and incorporate network
coding and information security. Bloch et al. [43] also develop research on wiretap
networks further. They show how the wiretap network is related to the client-server
architecture and thereafter implement wiretap codes on the network scenario. Wiretap
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networks have also been studied by Grokop et al. [35], where they incorporate source
coding, using the Slepian-Wolf rate on a broadcast channel that is wiretapped. It has
later been looked at via rank-metric codes for security [44]. Thereafter security of the
wiretap channel was investigated by Cai et al. [42].
An interesting development for the conventional wiretap network is the Wiretap Channel
II, introduced by Ozarow and Wyner [45] with a coset coding scheme. A characteristic
that makes the Wiretap Channel II different from the original wiretap channel is that
the former is error-free, which is why it can be incorporated into the network layer in
the 7 layer ISO model. The mathematical model for this wiretap channel II has been
given by Rouayheb et al. [6], and can be explained as follows: the channel between
a transmitter and receiver is error-free and can transmit n symbols of which µ can be
observed by the eavesdropper and the maximum secure rate can be shown to equal n−µ
symbols. This wiretap channel can also be looked at from a Gaussian approach and a
variation of this Gaussian wiretap channel has been investigated by Mitrpant et al. [46].
Security for the wiretap channel II has been spurred on by research by Luo et al. [47],
where the equivocation for a wiretap channel II that leaks certain source data symbols to
an eavesdropper was investigated. There has also been some work done on the Wiretap
Channel II that focuses on network coding, by Cai and Yeung [42] and Rouayheb et al.
[6]. Zhang [48] quantified the uncertainty of obtaining a source message after wiretapping
certain bits on a link in a Wiretap Channel II. Secrecy in the Wiretap Channel II was
looked at by Cheng et al. [49], where messages are encoded with some random key.
In an interesting application of the wiretap channel and wiretap channel of type II, Dai et
al. [50] presented a model that incorporates compromised encoded bits and wiretapped
bits from a noisy channel. The concept of a noiseless transmission gives rise to an ideal
situation in terms of noise when analyzing the model. In chapter 5, a scenario where
an eavesdropper has access to more than just the bits from the communication links is
considered.
Luo et al. [47], in some previous work, have described this sort of adversary as more
powerful because in addition to the eavesdropped bits from the communication links,
the eavesdropper also has access to some data symbols from the source. In other pre-
vious work [51], the information leakage for two correlated sources when some channel
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information from the communication links had been wiretapped was investigated. In-
tuitively from this work, it is seen that there is indeed more information gained by
the more powerful eavesdropper, not just in terms of the data symbols but in terms of
the alternate source, which results from the fact that the sources are correlated. This
concept is similar to that employed in the correlated source model developed Chapter
5. This makes it easier for the eavesdropper to determine the transmitted message and
information about another correlated source. Recently, security aspects of the wiretap
channel II has been researched by Rouayheb et al. [6], emphasizing that this area of
security for the wiretap channel II has room for growth.
2.3 Coding and Security Aspects for Correlated Sources
In this research project information theory is primarily used, however the interesting
relation between information theory and coding theory has also been explored. There
has been work done on wiretap channels for a coding approach. The first was done
by Wei [7] who presented the generalized Hamming weight to describe the minimum
uncertainty that an eavesdropper has access to. This uncertainty has been termed the
equivocation. The generalized Hamming weight uses the parity matrix rank to determine
the equivocation when various transmitted bits are eavesdropped. An extension of this
work was performed by Ngai et al. [52] to describe generalized Hamming weights for a
network scenario. Thereafter characteristics on this channel were introduced by Luo et
al. [47]. The characteristics focused on were those pertaining to Hamming weights and
Hamming distances in order to determine the equivocation of a wiretapper. Thereafter,
the security aspect of wiretap networks has been looked at in various ways by Cheng et
al. [49], and Cai and Yeung [42], emphasizing that it is of concern to secure this type of
channel.
The concern in this research in terms of coding theory is to find a link to information
theory so as to quantify the information leakage across links in a practical manner. The
work by Luo et al. [47] assists in achieving this goal.
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message codeword
error vector
biometric
codeword ⊕ error vector
codeword ⊕ biometric
Figure 2.5: Vinck’s [3] equivalent wiretap model
2.3.1 Matrix Partitions
The transmission of messages needs to satisfy the Slepian-Wolf bound in order for correct
decoding to occur at the receiver. Slepian-Wolf coding enables the transmission of
separately encoded messages and the joint decoding of them. The coset codes that have
been used by Wyner (used in many applications, e.g. by Wei [7] and Luo et al. [47]) have
been used by Pradhan and Ramachandran [53]. In this research project, the analogy
for a generator matrix to represent the equivocation presented by Luo et al. [47] to
determine the amount of leaked information is used. There have been many practical
syndrome based schemes (Yang et al. [54], Pradhan and Ramchandran [55] and Liveris
et al. [56]), one such example is that by Ma and Cheng [57], where partitions of the
generator matrix is also employed. We use the method supplied by Stankovic et al. [58]
in order to partition the matrices to make use of the matrix partition method, which is
optimal for Slepian-Wolf coding.
2.3.2 Coding for Wiretap Channels
Wiretap networks/representations have been looked at by Ozarow and Wyner [45] where
a coset coding scheme is employed with a wiretap channel of type II. There has also
been work for coding along wiretap channels in other instances, for example by Vinck
[3]. Here, the connection between biometrics, information theory and coding techniques
is explored. A wiretap representation is used to consider two new situations for the
wiretap channel.
In Figure 2.5, the message is a random vector satisfying a fixed length that is generated
at enrollment, to construct the codeword. The fingerprint biometric study has also been
done by Draper et al. [19] where Slepian-Wolf codes are incorporated, which relates very
closely to Vinck’s [3]. A similar link between information theory and coding theory has
been provided by Luo et al. [47], which is also explored in this research.
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This chapter gives a background of the field that has been researched. The novel work
documented by Shannon starts the chapter and thereafter the concept of correlated
sources, Shannon’s cipher system and wiretapped networks are broadly focused on.
These are important aspects of this research project as the models developed incorporate
correlated sources and wiretappers, and one security aspect focused on is the Shannon’s
cipher system. The implementation based on coding techniques and the related research
have also been mentioned as it forms an aspect of this research project.
Chapter 3
Techniques
This chapter includes a description of the methodologies and techniques used for the
research project. The technical aspects of these techniques are contained here to show
how the models in the chapters that follow have been developed and analyzed. The
various techniques are also required to quantify the information leakage and incorporate
the Shannon cipher approach for the models. Techniques such as the Slepian-Wolf
theorem that describes transmission rates for correlated sources and typical set encoding
and decoding, which is used to prove the Slepian-Wolf theorem and gives a method to
encode and decode messages using very small typical subsets are among the necessary
techniques for this work. Wiretap networks and the associated method used to analyze
the wiretapped links are thereafter included. The coding approaches used that make use
of generalized Hamming weights and a matrix partition method are described towards
the end of the chapter, as these techniques are used to form the link between information
theory and coding theory. These techniques and various others are described in this
chapter.
For the alphabets X and Y we define the discrete random variables X and Y having
length k each, where the symbols that belong to X and Y are represented by x and y
respectively. The probability distribution is given by p(x) for X and p(y) for Y . For
a collective set of these random variables, we can represent them as X1, X2, . . . , Xk,
having probability distributions p(x1, x2, . . . , xk), and Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk, having probability
distributions p(y1, y2, . . . , yk).
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3.1 Shannon’s Information Measures
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the concept of entropy was introduced by Shannon [15].
Here, an explanation of the various Shannon information measures developed as a result
of Shannon’s work are provided.
Entropy: For a random variable X, the entropy is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x) (3.1)
where p(x) is the probability distribution of X.
The base of the logarithm can be chosen to be any convenient real number greater than
one [1]. The entropy represents the level of uncertainty in a message as it is a function of
the probability distribution of X, which is the average amount of uncertainty removed
when the outcome of X is revealed [1].
For pairs of random variables, there are information measures in terms of the joint and
conditional entropies.
Joint entropy: For a pair of random variables X and Y , the joint entropy is defined as
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(x, y) (3.2)
where p(x, y) is the joint probability distribution of X and Y .
Similarly, using the conditional probability distribution for two random variables X and
Y , i.e. p(x, y) the conditional entropy definition follows.
Conditional entropy: For a pair of random variables X and Y , the conditional entropy
is defined as
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(x|y) (3.3)
An important relation between these information measures can be considered as follows:
H(X,Y ) = H(Y ) +H(X|Y ) or H(X,Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X).
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The mutual information between sources is also of interest in determining the dependence
of sources and has been described in fundamental information theory literature [1][4].
Mutual information: For a pair of random variables X and Y , the mutual information
between X and Y is defined as
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log
p(x|y)
p(x)p(y)
(3.4)
The relations between the joint entropies, conditional entropies and mutual information
is given as follows: I(X;Y ) = H(X)+H(Y )−H(X,Y ). Yeung [1] showed that all these
Shannon information measures are special cases of the conditional mutual information.
The Venn diagram in Figure 3.1 shows the visual representation of these information
measures.
H(X,Y )
H(X) H(Y )
I(X;Y ) H(Y |X)H(X|Y )
Figure 3.1: Venn diagram illustrating Shannon’s information measures
After Shannon’s work, there has been research to find the transmission rates for various
other models. These techniques mentioned below and the information leakage bounds
result from the Slepian-Wolf coding scenario, which is a method of coding that utilizes
two compressed correlated sources.
3.1.1 I -Measure
The I -measure has been developed to assist in establishing a one-to-one correspondence
between Shannon’s information measures and set theory in full generality [1]. This allows
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for set operations to be used with certain forms of Shannon information measures, which
brings in some more diversity to the operations used in information theory.
Let X1 and X2 be random variables and X˜1 and X˜2 be sets corresponding to X1 and X2,
respectively. An information diagram is used to represent these sets, which is actually
a conventional Venn diagram. The universal set, which is the union of X˜1 and X˜2, does
not need to be shown explicitly just as in a usual Venn diagram [1]. Writing A ∩ Bc
(i.e. the complement of B) as A − B, Yeung [1] has defined a signed measure µ∗ (the
I -measure) by
µ∗(X˜1 − X˜2) = H(X1|X2)
µ∗(X˜2 − X˜1) = H(X2|X1)
and µ∗(X˜1 ∩ X˜2) = I(X1;X2) (3.5)
The entropies of X and Y are given by µ∗(X˜1) = H(X1) and µ∗(X˜2) = H(X2) respec-
tively.
The remaining set can be obtained via set-additivity, in order to achieve the Shannon
information measure of H(X,Y ). This is done as follows:
µ∗(X˜1 ∪ X˜2)
= µ∗(X˜1 − X˜2) + µ∗(X˜2 − X˜1) + µ∗(X˜1 ∩ X˜2)
= H(X1|X2) +H(X2|X1) + I(X1;X2)
= H(X1, X2) (3.6)
Hence, all Shannon information measures for this scenario for 2 sources can be repre-
sented by the I -measure. Upon realizing this I-measure the set operations may be used
in information theory.
3.1.2 Markov Model
The properties and concepts from Section 3.2 onward deal with i.i.d processes, however
when the processes are dependent then the Markov model concept may be used. More
specifically the Markov model focuses on processes that are stochastic where the random
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variables only depend on the variable preceding it and is conditionally independent of
all the other preceding random variables [4].
Markov Chain: A markov chain is one where, for the stochastic processes X1, X2, . . . , Xn
for n = 1, 2, . . . ,:
Pr(Xn+1 = xn+1|Xn = xn, Xn−1 = xn−1, . . . , X1 = x1)
= Pr(Xn+1 = xn+1|Xn = xn) (3.7)
for all x1, x2, . . . , xn, xn+1 ∈ X .
This means that if X → Y → Z form a Markov chain (as depicted in Figure 3.2) then
X and Y are dependent, and so are Y and Z, but there is no dependence between X
and Z.
X Y Z
Figure 3.2: Markov model for X,Y and Z
This technique is used to prove certain information theory relations: e.g. the data
processing theorem, the relation I(X;Y ;Z) ≥ I(X;Y ) [1] and Markov fields [4].
3.2 Correlated Source Coding
The messages from correlated sources have some similarity (measure of correlation)
between them. Correlated source coding incorporates the lossless compression of two
or more correlated data streams. Each of the correlated streams is encoded separately
and the compressed data from each of the encoders are jointly decoded by a single
decoder as shown in Figure 3.3, for two correlated streams. The work described in
this research project incorporates multiple correlated sources, however two sources are
illustrated here to show the concept. This idea of transmitting compressed information
came about as a result of the threat posed by correlated sources. Correlated sources
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are a security risk when the correlated bits are known as an eavesdropper is able to
gain additional information about the source. The correlated bits that have not been
transmitted become additional information that the eavesdropper has access to. Hence,
the need for correlated source coding.
Encoder
Encoder
Decoder
t1
t2
X
Y
Figure 3.3: Correlated data streams
Here, X and Y are the correlated sources and t1 and t2 are the syndromes (compressed
form of the original message) transmitted by X and Y respectively. The correlation is an
advantage because less information needs to be transmitted across the channel (i.e. t1
and t2 are shorter in length than the messages at X and Y respectively), as it is not nec-
essary to transmit the correlated information. Correlated sources thus have the ability to
decrease the bandwidth required to transmit and receive messages because a syndrome
is sent across the communication links instead of the original message. As mentioned
in Chapter 1, the compressed message has more information per bit and therefore has
a higher entropy. This is because the transmitted information is more unpredictable as
there is no redundancy in this case. The unpredictability of the compressed message is
also beneficial in terms of securing the information.
In order to encode correlated sources symbols, we need to ensure that the transmission
rates satisfy certain transmission bounds. This is done through the use of Slepian-Wolf
coding. In order to understand the Slepian-Wolf theorem the asymptotic equipartition
property through the concept of typical sequences needs to be described as the Slepian-
Wolf theorem uses it as a fundamental building block.
3.2.1 Typical Sequences
An -typical set of X, A
(n)
 (X) is a small subset of the set X having certain properties
that will be described in this section. It is seen that the size of the typical set when
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compared to the entire set approaches zero for large n [1]. The typical sequence is
important because even though it is insignificant in terms of size when compared to the
entire set it contains almost all the probability.
Typical sequences can either be strongly typical (difference between frequency of possi-
ble outcomes and corresponding probability is very small) or weakly typical (difference
between empirical entropy and true entropy is very small). Strong typicality can be used
for proving memoryless theorems, shown by Yeung [1] and is built on from the strong
AEP (asymptotic equipartition property). The limitation for strong typicality is that
it can only be used for random variables with finite alphabets, however there has been
recent work on making strong typicality work for instances of infinite alphabets [59].
When a sequence or set is strongly typical then it implies weak typicality [1]. Weak typ-
icality is commonly used in relation to the source coding theorem and is related to the
Shannon-McMillan-Breiman Theorem by Yeung [1]. The weak AEP is used to interpret
weakly typical sequences.
The weak AEP law specifies that the probability for a symbol x as it approaches H(X)
when n is large. This law is an application of the weak law of large numbers.
Weak AEP Law :
Pr{| − 1
n
log p(x)−H(X)| ≤ } > 1−  (3.8)
The quantity − 1n log p(x) is the empirical entropy of X, which is close to the true entropy
for a weakly typical sequence. If a sequence X = {x1, x2, . . . xn} is drawn the weak AEP
specifies that the probability of the sequence drawn is 2−nH(X) with a high probability,
i.e. a weakly typical sequence has probability 2−nH(X). For large n we can therefore
imagine x as been obtained directly from the weakly typical set.
Here, we use weakly typical sequences that are jointly typical. The concept of jointly
typical sequences extends from the joint AEP (proved by Cover and Thomas [4]). For
joint AEP we consider two variables (Xn, Y n) ∈ X and Y respectively, having probabil-
ities (p(x), p(y)). The following properties exist:
• The probability that (Xn, Y n) belong to the a typical set approaches one as n
becomes large
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• The size of the typicality set is 2n(H(X,Y )+)
• If there exists two independent variables (X ′, Y ′) that have the same probability
distribution as (p(x), p(y)), then the probability that (X ′, Y ′) are part of the typical
set is upper bounded by 2n(I(X;Y )−3).
The first property is proven using the weak law of large numbers. For the second
property the probability is summed over the entire typical set, which has a probability of
2−n(H(X,Y )+) by definition, resulting in a size of 2n(H(X,Y )+). The third property results
from the fact that the probability distributions (p(x), p(y)) summed over the typical
sequence is upper bounded by 2-nH(X) and 2-nH(Y ) subtracted from 2-nH(X,Y ). Using
the Shannon’s information theoretic relation here, H(X,Y )−H(X)−H(Y ) = I(X;Y )
and collection of the , we obtain the result for the third property.
It is seen that in the jointly typical set there are 2nH(X) and 2nH(Y ) typical sequences
for X and Y respectively. However as pointed out by Cover and Thomas [4] there are
only 2nH(X,Y ) jointly typical sequences so not all pairs of typical Xn and typical Y n are
also jointly typical; in fact there is a probability of 2−nI(X;Y ) that any randomly chosen
pair is jointly typical.
For typical sequences, there are three important properties:
• the probability that a typical sequence belongs to the typical set approaches one
when n is large
• the probability distribution for a typical sequence is given by 2n(H(S)±)
• the size of the typical sequence is 2n(H(S)±2)
Here the set of S, A
(n)
 (S), which is a small subset of the set S is used. The first property
is a result of the law of large numbers. The second property follows from the definition
of a typical sequence, as we know the following:
− 1
n
log p(s) < H(S)−  (3.9)
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The third property follows from this second property where the probability distribution
is summed over all s ∈ A(n) , which has a result of 1. When we assume n is sufficiently
large we are able to use the probability distribution 2−n(H(S)−) for the probability of
1− , thus providing both bounds.
For jointly typical sequences, there exists a set that is jointly typical to variables in X ,
denoted by A
(n)
 (S) where S = (X1, X2). The joint probability distribution for (x1, x2)
can be approximated by H(X1, X2) when n is very large. Thus, the following property
for the conditional probability distribution for jointly typical sequences is developed:
p(s1|s2) = 2n(H(S1|S2)±2) (3.10)
for (S1, S2) ∈ {X1, X2, . . . , Xk} where (s1, s2) ∈ A(n) (S1, S2). To prove this property
the following relation is used:
p(s2|s1) = p(s1, s2)
p(s1)
(3.11)
where p(s1, s2) = 2
−n(H(S1,S2)±) and p(s1) = 2−n(H(S1)±). Substituting these into
equation (3.11) and using the relation H(S1, S2) − H(S1) = H(S2|S1) we obtain the
desired result as shown in (3.10).
Just as joint typicality can be defined for typical sequences, so can conditional typicality.
This concept is not used for this work, however descriptions of such sequences can be
found in Cover and Thomas [4].
3.2.2 Slepian-Wolf Coding
The Slepian-Wolf theorem gives a bound on the minimum number of bits per character
required for the encoded message streams in order to ensure accurate reconstruction
(with an arbitrarily small error probability) at the decoder. The system efficiency is
measured by the rates that the encoder outputs the encoded bits per character. Slepian
and Wolf [17] produced the following result:
Slepian-Wolf Theorem: For two correlated sources X and Y transmitting messages to
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a destination node T (depicted in Figure 3.4), the transmission rates (RX , RY ) satisfy
the following inequalities:
RX ≥ H(X|Y )
RY ≥ H(Y |X)
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y ) (3.12)
where RX and RY represent the rate allocation for the correlated sources X and Y
respectively. This means that X and Y need to have a rate allocation of H(X,Y ) to
ensure that the received messages can be decoded correctly.
X Y
T
Rx ≥ H(X|Y ) Ry ≥ H(Y |X)
Figure 3.4: Diagram showing rate allocation for correlated sources X and Y
The Slepian-Wolf theorem is described using the concept of typical sequences and bin-
ning. Here, X is partitioned into 2nR1 bins and Y is partitioned into 2nR2 bins. The
idea of random bins is that we choose a large random index for each source sequence and
since the typical sequence is small, there is a different index for different source sequences
with high probability. The code is generated by assigning all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y into one
of 2nR1 bins for X and 2nR2 bins for Y . For X and Y the assignment to bins is inde-
pendent according to the uniform distribution on {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} and {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2}
respectively.
The encoding and decoding is done as follows:
Encoding: For X, the index of the bin where X belongs is transmitted. For Y , the index
of the bin where Y belongs is transmitted.
Decoding: There are one of two options. Firstly, if there is only one typical sequence
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belonging to the bin then declare the typical sequence to be the result of X and Y , i.e.
if there is only one pair (x, y) such that f1(x) = i0, f2(y) = j0 and (x, y) ∈ A(n) . Here,
f1 and f2 are the assignments to the bins for X and Y respectively. Otherwise, declare
an error. During decoding, the pair of indices that have been transmitted specifies a
product bin, as depicted in Figure 3.5. Here, we note that the binning scheme need
not be characterized at the transmitter, just at the receiver. According to Cover and
Thomas [4] it is this property that allows this code to function for distributed sources.
x
y 2
nR1 bins
2nR2 bins
2nH(X,Y ) jointly typical pairs (x, y)
Figure 3.5: Slepian-Wolf encoding: the jointly typical pairs are described by the
product bins [4]
Proof of Slepian-Wolf theorem. In order to prove that the Slepian-Wolf theorem is achiev-
able, it is shown that the error probability is calculated to be bounded by 4. Four error
events are defined:
• Pe0: the received sequence does not belong to the typical set
• Pe1: there exists another x, i.e. x′ in the bin that is jointly typical with Y
• Pe2: there exists another y, i.e. y′ in the bin that is jointly typical with X
• Pe3: there exists another (x, y) in the bin that belongs to the jointly typical set.
where (Pe0, Pe1, Pe2, Pe3) indicate the probabilities of the error events described above.
The union of these error event probabilities provide the upper bound for the error
probability.
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From the joint AEP, we know that the probability the sequence does not belong to the
jointly typical sequence is small, and as n becomes large this error is bounded by .
Therefore Pe0 ≤ .
For Pe1, we use the fact that the error probability is upper bounded by the joint prob-
ability distribution summed over all (x, y) (which is 1) and the probability that there
exists an x′ in the same bin summed over the typical sequence (which is the size of the
typical sequence times 2nR1). This is shown in equation form below:
∑
(x,y)
p(x, y)
∑
(x′,y)
∈ A(n) P (f1(x′) = f1(x))
=
∑
(x′,y)
|A(X|y)|2−nR1
≤ 2n(H(X|Y )+)2−nR1 (3.13)
We can see that if R1 > H(X|Y ) then for sufficiently large n (3.13) tends to 0, hence
the error probability is upper bounded by . This means Pe1 ≤ . Similarly the third
and fourth events can be shown to be upper bounded by  each when R2 > H(Y |X)
and R1 + R2 > H(X,Y ). The combination of these upper bounds results in an error
probability of 4. This is shown by equations (3.14) and as follows.
∑
(x,y)
p(x, y)
∑
(x,y′)
∈ A(n) P (f2(y) = f2(y′))
=
∑
(x,y′)
|A(x|Y )|2−nR1
≤ 2n(H(Y |X)+)2−nR2 (3.14)
For Pe2, the fact that the error probability is upper bounded by the joint probability
distribution summed over all (x, y) (which is 1) and the probability that there exists an
y′ in the same bin summed over the typical sequence (which is the size of the typical
sequence times 2nR2 is used to determine the probability. It is seen that as R2 >
H(Y |X) then for sufficiently large n (3.14) tends to 0, hence the error probability is
upper bounded by . This implies that Pe2 ≤ .
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For the remaining probability Pe3 we use the following as a result for there existence of
another typical sequence in the same bin.
∑
(x,y)
p(x, y)
∑
(x,y)
∈ A(n) P (f2(y) = f2(y′))
=
∑
(x,y)
|A(X|Y )|2−nR12−nR2
≤ 2n(H(X,Y )+)2−nR12−nR2 (3.15)
From the result of (3.15) it is seen that as R1 + R2 > H(X,Y ) then for sufficiently
large n, (3.15) tends to 0, hence the error probability is also upper bounded by . This
implies that Pe3 ≤ . The combination of probabilities for these four error events,
(Pe0 , Pe1 , Pe2 , Pe3) is therefore upper bounded by 4. This proof shows the achievability
of the Slepain-Wolf theorem, which has a major impact for correlated sources.
There has been important work that makes use of the Slepian-Wolf theorem, for exam-
ple that by Yamamoto [5] and Villard et al. [60]. These schemes use the Slepian-Wolf
theorem to provide models for applications on broadcast channels, linking digital and
analogue schemes [61] and binary erasure channels [60]. These therefore form the build-
ing blocks for systems of such applications. This points out that the research presented
herein may also be used for these applications and in these ways to better the security
of the system.
Optimizing the transmission rate regions is an aspect of Slepian-Wolf coding. As the rate
increases the security decreases, which comes from the deduction that the error entropy
is proportional to the information rate. Thus, in order to achieve optimal security, the
rate should decrease.
Yang et al. [2] incorporate the Slepian-Wolf theorem into their study and give an indi-
cation of the achievable region for Slepian-Wolf codes (Figure 3.6).
The shaded region indicated in Figure 3.6 is that where the decoder can recover X and
Y with arbitrarily small error (i.e the achievable region). The compression rate in bits
is given by RX and RY to encode X and Y respectively. When transmission occurs in
this region then decoding can occur correctly.
Chapter 3. Techniques 34
RY
RX
H(X,Y )
H(Y )
H(Y |X)
H(X|Y ) H(X) H(X,Y )
Figure 3.6: Diagram showing achievable region for the Slepian-Wolf theorem [2]
3.2.3 Shannon’s Cipher System
The Shannon cipher system was the first information-theoretically secure communication
system [42], and operates based on the following protocol:
For sources X and Y , sending a message m to the destination T :
• Generate e (secret key)
• Send m+ e (mod p) over the public channel, where m is the message intended for
the receiver
• Send e over the private channel
After transmission, the receiver has access to both m+e and e and can therefore retrieve
m. The main idea is that the sender must randomize the message to protect it from the
wiretapper. However, it is important to note that randomization decreases throughput
as more bandwidth is necessary to transmit the various randomized versions of the source
message.
Yamamoto [5] used Shannon’s cipher system for correlated sources that transmit infor-
mation across a common link (depicted in Figure 3.7). A key is used at the encoder to
encode the messages and the same key is provided at the decoder in order to decode the
messages. The encoding and decoding functions therefore include a key. The security
of the system largely depends on the key security. The security levels are defined and
described by Yamamoto [5] to characterize the security for each source X and Y by
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(hX , hY ) and their combined security hXY . Later in this work the same notation is
used for describing the security levels. The purpose of incorporating Shannon’s cipher
system for Yamamoto [5] was to determine the transmission and key rates necessary for
obtaining perfect secrecy.
X,Y X, Y
Encoder DecoderSource
Key Generator
S = (X,Y )
W
Wk
Wiretapper
Figure 3.7: Shannon cipher system [5]
In Figure 3.7, the correlated sources are represented by X and Y , W is the cryptogram
and Wk is the key. In Yamamoto’s study in [5], the correlated sources are focused on
and the key rate for a certain level is defined. In the study in [40], certain parameters
(admissible region of cryptogram rate, key rate, legitimate receiver’s distortion, wiretap-
per’s uncertainty) for the Shannon cipher system with a noisy channel are determined.
In an extension of the Shannon cipher system, Yamamoto [37] investigated the secret
sharing communication system.
3.3 Wiretap Networks
The wiretapped network concept comes from the need to model a scenario where there
is an eavesdropper present. The concept of wiretap network is best explained as a com-
munication network and a collection of subsets of wiretap channels, where a wiretapper
can eavesdrop on the packets on a limited number of network edges of its choice. There
are models developed for the wiretap channel of type I and type II. The wiretap channel
type II is an error-free version of the type I channel.
The mathematical model for Wiretap Channel II is given by Rouayheb et al. [6], and
can be explained as follows: the channel between a transmitter and receiver is error-free
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and can transmit n symbols Y = (y1, . . . , yn) from which µ bits can be observed by the
eavesdropper and the maximum secure rate can be shown to equal n− µ bits.
Here, µ is therefore the upper bound of information that can be leaked. This Wiretap
Channel II concept is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 3.8.
Encoder Decoder
m
Eavesdropper
Transmitter Receiver
Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
µ bits
Figure 3.8: Wiretap Channel II concept [6]
In Figure 3.8, m is the source output, Y = (y1, . . . , yn) are the transmitted codewords
and µ is the wiretapped information. The components of a wiretap network are as
follows:
• Directed multigraph G = (V,E), where G is acyclic, V is a node set and E is the
edge set for the directed multigraph
• Source node, S
• Collection of a set of wiretapped edges (A), which is a collection of the subsets
of edges, E (i.e. A ⊆ E). More than one element of A may be accessed by a
wiretapper
• Set of user nodes, U (i.e. the users that are meant to receive the message m)
The quadruple (G,S,U,A) is referred to as a wiretap network [42]. In terms of the
wiretap network, it is of concern to transmit messages across the network, while a
wiretapper can access any set of the edges in A.
The wiretapped concept is also used in the Shannon cipher system, which has been
investigated by Yamamoto [5] [40].
Chapter 3. Techniques 37
3.3.1 Ozarow and Wyner’s Method
The method for information hiding across a wiretap channel was introduced by Ozarow
and Wyner [45], which hereafter is referred to as Ozarow’s and Wyner’s method. The
linear code is represented as a (n, n −K) code, where n > K. The wiretapper is able
to access their choice of µ < n bits. The scheme involves coset coding.
Ozarow and Wyner [45] define the Wiretap Channel II as follows:
Encoder
XK Xn
Wiretapped information is part of Xn
Figure 3.9: Diagram showing the set-up of the Wire-tap Channel II
where XK is the source output and Xn is the n bit binary transmitted sequence across
an error-free channel.
The uniqueness in this method lies in two considerations:
• a one to one relationship between the error patterns of length n and message of
length K, that is to be received by the decoder, and
• the difficulty in determining the required error pattern if only one link is wire-
tapped.
This scheme is able to transmit K bits of information, using n bits, and is defined for
a peer to peer scenario. Each message m is uniquely mapped to an error pattern e(m),
and the receiver is required to determine this e(m) in order to find m.
Here, x has length n and is randomly chosen from the generated codebook, based on the
codeword, and the transmitted sequence also has a length n. This sequence is a linear
representation of x and an error pattern as indicated in (3.16).
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x⊕ e(m) (3.16)
where e(m) is the error pattern corresponding to the information. This is illustrated
diagrammatically in Figure 3.10.
S T
x⊕ e(m)
Figure 3.10: General representation of Ozarow’s method
There is a unique mapping between the 2K error patterns and messages that are to
be transmitted. The decoder, T in Figure 3.10 receives x ⊕ e(m) and at a later time
obtains/receives x. Thereafter, the exclusive-or of x ⊕ e(m) and x is performed, which
results in the error message, e(m) and due to the one to one mapping of the message
with the error patterns, the original message m can easily be obtained. Here, the value
of x acts as a mask in order to hide the error pattern that is being transmitted.
The advantage of this method in terms of secrecy is that if the link in Figure 3.10 is
wiretapped then it is not possible to determine the error pattern that corresponds to
the information being transmitted, hence the information remains secure.
This method is extended by Silva and Kschischang [44] where a proposed coset coding
scheme is defined over an extension field.
3.3.2 Generalized Hamming Weight
The generalized Hamming weight concept is illustrated initially using the Ozarow and
Wyner coding scheme presented above, by Wei [7]. Here, the generalized Hamming
weight concept is presented for linear codes that completely characterize the performance
of a linear code when it is used in a Wiretap Channel II. Based on using the minimum
Hamming weight as a certain minimum property of one-dimensional sub codes, the au-
thors obtain a generalized concept of higher-dimensional Hamming weights. A ‘security
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curve’ depicting the level of security for a (15,11) Hamming code is developed [7], and
this shows the variation in the amount of information a wiretapper gains when having
access to µ = {0, 1, . . . , 15} bits of the message. The ‘security curve’ is shown below:
8 12 14
Equivocation
4 bits
s
Figure 3.11: Security curve as developed by Wei [7]
The wiretapper is able to listen to any s bits, and the corresponding equivocation (i.e.
the wiretapper’s uncertainty in the message) is depicted in Figure 3.11. The equivocation
is calculated based on equation (3.17) as follows:
min|I|=n−srank(< Hi : i ∈ I >) (3.17)
where n is the number of bits of the source message, s is the number of bits that are
wiretapped and H is the parity-check matrix for the codewords.
In order to determine the level of security, the minimum rank of the parity-check matrix
H (using the column vectors) is calculated for each possibility of the number of leaked
bits. This gives an indication of how much of uncertainty the wiretapper has in recon-
structing the source message; the more the uncertainty, the more secure the system. The
information leakage is therefore determined by the number of independent columns in
H, i.e. the rank of the parity-check matrix. The drops for the curve depicted in Figure
3.11 occur at the generalized Hamming weights of the codeword matrix [7].
An interesting study based on the equivocation of data symbols is done by Luo et
al. [47], where the user is split into multiple parties who are coordinated in coding
their data symbols by using the same encoder. The wiretapper is able to tap partial
transmitted symbols (i.e. Zµ) and partial data symbols (i.e. S2, as the source S is divided
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into two portions, S1 and S2). The generalized Hamming weight concept explained
above is extended in the study, and shown to be useful for designing a perfect secrecy
coding scheme for many parties. Here, the equivocation is investigated by analysing the
difference between the ranks of a matrix (one that is constructed such that it can be
used to calculate the received data bits) and a sub matrix of it.
The idea of equivocation and matrix partitions are used to determine how much of
information the eavesdropper has access to. The generator matrix is split to represent
the data symbols and a sub matrix is subtracted from the generator matrix in order to
determine the equivocation. Luo et al. [47] proved the following:
rank G− rank G2 = min[H(S1, S2|Zµ)−H(S2|Zµ)] (3.18)
where G2 is the sub matrix of G, the generator matrix corresponding to the eavesdropped
data symbols. For Luo et al. [47] the G matrix is divided into two portions, G1 and G2.
Equation (3.18) shows that these ranks may be used to determine certain equivocations.
The overall result is the equivocation on S1, given Z
µ and S2. This result is essential
in providing the link between coding theory and information theory and has been used
accordingly for this research project.
3.4 Coding Techniques for Correlated Sources
The coding technique that this research uses to show the link between information theory
and coding theory is termed the matrix partition method and is described in this section.
This concept of matrix partition has been used to show practical implementation of
certain techniques or coding theories. Here, a method that incorporates a partitioned
generator matrix is described, and as mentioned in Chapter II there have been other
such techniques that partition generator matrices; namely those developed by Yang et
al. [54], Pradhan and Ramchandran [55], Liveris et al. [56] and Ma and Cheng [57].
Stankovic et al. [58] mention one of the basic techniques used for source correlation;
a matrix partition approach is adopted. The general Slepian-Wolf code pair (C,m) is
defined in [17], where C is an (n, k) linear code, which has a generator matrix Gk×n and
m is a set of integers {m1,m2, . . . ,mL}. Here, L is the number of partitions of the G
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matrix. The codebook C, which is the product of the message, m (of length k bits) and
the generator matrix is represented below:
c = m×G (3.19)
The two correlated sources are X and Y and can produce codewords c (where c ∈ C) of
length n; x and y are the source messages. The correlated sources satisfy the Slepian-
Wolf theorem given in equation (3.19). Sub matrices for the generator and parity-check
matrices, G and H respectively, are initially constructed. Thereafter the syndromes
si = (s1, . . . , sL) (where L is the number of partitions of the G matrix) are constructed
and transmitted. The decoder is then responsible for reconstructing the source messages
from the transmitted syndrome.
The partition of G and resultant partitions in H are calculated as per the partitions
specified by the matrix partition method [58]:
G =
[
Ik Pk×(n−k)
]
(3.20)
Gi =
[
Omi×mi− Imi Omi×mi+ Pimi×(n−k)
]
(3.21)
Hi =

Imi− Omi−×mi Omi−×mi+ Omi−×(n−k)
Omi+×mi− Omi+×mi Imi+ Omi+×(n−k)
O(n−k)×mi+ P
T
mi O(n−k)×mi+ In−k
 (3.22)
Where Oi is a zero matrix, of size defined by the subscript i and Ij is an identity matrix,
of size defined by the subscript j. Here, Pk and Pi make up the Pk×(n−k) component of
a particular G matrix, as defined in equation (3.20).
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After these partitions are formed the syndromes are calculated by multiplying the source
message xi =
[
ui ai vi qi
]
, (which has length mi−, mi, mi+ and n− k respectively)
with the parity-check matrix H to result in:
si =

uTi
vTi
qTi ⊕ P Ti aTi
 (3.23)
The source messages are compressed into syndromes of length n−mi bits in this step.
At the decoder, the first step is to decompress the syndromes. This is done as indicated
below:
ti =

uTi
Omi×1
vTi
qTi ⊕ P Ti aTi
 (3.24)
The results of t1 ⊕ t2, . . . ,⊕tL are calculated. The codeword satisfying the following is
found:
dmin(t1 ⊕ t2, c) (3.25)
where dmin is the minimum Hamming distance and c ∈ C, where C is the codebook.
For example, for a (7, 4) Hamming code where two rows of G are used to calculate the
subcode for each encoder, the G and H matrices take the following form (this also gives
an indication of matrix dimensions):
G1 =
[
O2×2 I2 O2×2 P12×3
]
(3.26)
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G2 =
[
O2×2 I2 O2×2 P22×3
]
(3.27)
H1 =

I2 O2×2 O2×2 O2×3
O2×2 O2×2 I2 O2×3
O3×2 P T1 O3×2 I3
 (3.28)
H2 =

I2 O2×2 O2×2 O2×3
O2×2 O2×2 I2 O2×3
O3×2 P T2 O3×2 I3
 (3.29)
In order to encode, the n length (in this case n = 7) vector xi =
[
ui ai vi qi
]
is
multiplied by the parity-check matrix, H. In this way the syndromes are formed as
follows:
s1 =
 vT1
qT1 ⊕ P T1 aT1
 (3.30)
s2 =
 uT2
qT2 ⊕ P T2 aT2
 (3.31)
In order to assist with decoding, n-length row vectors t1 and t2 are defined as:
t1 =

O2×1
vT1
qT1 ⊕ P T1 aT1
 (3.32)
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t2 =

uT2
O2×1
qT2 ⊕ P T2 aT2
 (3.33)
Stankovic et al. [58] make the conclusion that xi ⊕ ti = aiGi is a valid codeword of Ci
(the codeword sub matrix) and thus C (the codeword matrix). At the decoder, both
syndromes are collected and t1 ⊕ t2 is calculated. The decoder is then tasked with
finding a codeword that is closest (in Hamming distance) to the result of t1 ⊕ t2, as per
the representation in (3.25). The sources are recovered as:
x1 = a1G1 ⊕ t1 (3.34)
and
x2 = a2G2 ⊕ t2 (3.35)
where a1 and a2 are the decoded systematic parts of the codeword. It is thus possible
to retrieve X and Y using the systematic part of the codeword, the generator matrix
and the received syndrome.
This method is one of the methods that partition the generator matrix in order to
transmit information effectively for correlated sources. In work by Ma and Cheng [57],
the generator matrix is also similarly split so that each portion can be used to determine
the resultant message for a particular source. There has also been similar partition
methods provided by Yang et al. [54], Pradhan and Ramchandran [55] and Liveris et
al. [56], where each examines a particular coding method for these partitions.
This chapter contained the descriptions of the techniques that have been used in this
research project. The techniques used to analyze the security aspects have been pre-
sented; namely Slepian-Wolf theorem and Shannon’s cipher system, together with the
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associated methodologies involved in proving these theorems or methods. Wiretap net-
works have also been explored followed by descriptions of the coding techniques involved
in analyzing the models that have been developed.
Chapter 4
Information Leakage for Multiple
Correlated Sources using
Slepian-Wolf Coding
This chapter initially details a generalized correlated source model, which is an extension
of the novel two correlated source model described later in this chapter and the corre-
lated source models described in the following chapters. One of the main contributions
is the development of the two correlated source model (there is reference made during
the chapter to the difference between this model and the others from the literature re-
viewed, emphasizing the novelty). There are initially two avenues explored to investigate
the information leakage in this chapter; one quantifying the information leakage for the
Slepian-Wolf scenario and the other incorporating Shannon’s cipher system where key
lengths are minimized and a masking method to save on keys is presented. The security
aspects of the two correlated source model is also a contribution. An important contri-
bution thereafter is the coding approach for the two correlated source model. There are
details describing the coding approach contained in this chapter, which show practical
implementation for the novel model developed and provides an important link between
the information theory and coding theory fields.
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4.1 A Generalized Model for Multiple Correlated Sources
Consider multiple correlated sources transmitting information to a single receiver. There
is common and private information transmitted along the links, which in the presence
of a wiretapper may be compromised. Here, the multiple correlated sources transmit
compressed information across multiple links, which are wiretapped. Figure 4.1 gives a
pictorial view of the model for multiple correlated sources. The notation used in this
figure is explained below.
Receiver
S1 S2 Sn
TS1 TS2 TSn
Figure 4.1: Extended generalized model
Consider a situation where there are many sources, which are part of the set S :
S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}
where i represents the ith source (i = 1, . . . , n) and there are n sources in total. Each
source may have some correlation with another source and all sources are part of a
binary alphabet. There is one receiver that is responsible for performing decoding. The
syndrome for a source Si is represented by TSi , which is part of the same alphabet as
the sources. The entropy of a source is given by a combination of a specific conditional
entropy and mutual information. In order to present the entropy we first define the
following sets:
- The set, S that contains all sources: S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}.
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- The set, St that contains t unique elements from S and St ⊆ S, Si ∈ St, St ∪ Sct
= S and |St| = t
Here, H(Si) is obtained as follows:
H(Si) = H(Si|S\Si) +
n∑
t=2
(−1)t−1
∑
all possible St
I(St|Sct) (4.1)
where n is the number of sources, H(Si|S\Si) denotes the conditional entropy of the
source Si given Si subtracted from the set S and I(St|Sct) denotes the mutual information
between all sources in the subset St given the complement of St. It is possible to decode
the source message for source Si by receiving all components related to Si. This gives
rise to the following inequality for H(Si) in terms of the sources:
H(Si|S\Si) +
n∑
t=2
(−1)t−1
∑
all possible St
I(St|Sct)
≤ H(Si) + δ (4.2)
In this type of model information from multiple links may need to be gathered in order
to determine the transmitted information for one source because common information
may be transmitted by other links. Here, the common information between sources is
represented by the I(St|Sct) term. The portions of common information sent by each
source can be determined upfront and is arbitrarily allocated.
The information leakage for this multiple source model is indicated in (4.3) and (4.4).
Remark 1: The leaked information for a source Si given the transmitted codewords TSi ,
is given by:
LSiTSi
= I(Si;TSi) (4.3)
Since the notion that the information leakage is the conditional entropy of the source
given the transmitted information subtracted from the source’s uncertainty (i.e H(Si)−
H(Si|TSi)), the proof for (4.3) is trivial. Here, the common information is the minimum
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amount of information leaked. Each source is responsible for transmitting its own private
information and there is a possibility that this private information may also be leaked.
The maximum leakage for this case is thus the uncertainty of the source itself, H(Si).
We also consider the information leakage for a source Si when another source Sj(j 6=i) has
transmitted information. This gives rise to Remark 2.
Remark 2: The leaked information for a source Si given the transmitted codewords
TSj , where i 6= j is:
LSiTSj
= H(Si)−H(Si|TSj )
= H(Si)− [H(Si)− I(Si;TSj )]
= I(Si;TSj ) (4.4)
The information leakage for a source is determined based on the information transmitted
from any other channel using the common information between them. The private
information is not considered as it is transmitted by each source itself and can therefore
not be obtained from an alternate channel. Remark 2 therefore gives an indication of the
maximum amount of information leaked for source Si, with knowledge of the syndrome
TSj .
The common information provides information for more than one source and is therefore
important to secure as it leaks information about more than one source. This section
gives an indication of the information leakage for the multiple correlated sources model.
4.2 Two Correlated Source Model
A special case of multiple correlated sources is now investigated. The independent,
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sourcesX and Y are mutually correlated random variables,
depicted in Figure 4.2. The alphabet sets for sources X and Y are represented by X
and Y respectively. Assume that (XK , Y K) are encoded into two syndromes (TX and
TY ). The compressed representation is as follows: TX = (VX , VCX) and TY = (VY , VCY )
where TX and TY are the syndromes of X and Y . Here, TX and TY are characterized by
(VX , VCX) and (VY , VCY ) respectively. The Venn diagram in Figure 4.3 easily illustrates
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this idea where it is shown that VX and VY represent the private information of sources
XK and Y K respectively and VCX and VCY represent the common information between
XK and Y K generated by XK and Y K respectively.
XK Y K
TYTX
XˆK , Yˆ K
Encoder Encoder
Decoder
Figure 4.2: Correlated source coding for two sources
VX VY
VCX VCY
X Y
TX = (VX , VCX) TY = (VY , VCY )
Figure 4.3: The relation between private and common information
The correlated sources X and Y transmit messages (in the form of syndromes) to the
receiver along wiretapped links. The decoder determines X and Y only after receiving all
of TX and TY . The common information between the sources are transmitted through
the portions VCX and VCY . In order to determine a transmitted message, a source’s
private information and a common information portion are necessary.
Here, the Slepian-Wolf bound is reached. The lengths of TX and TY are not fixed as
it depends on the encoding process and nature of the Slepian-Wolf codes. The process
is therefore not ideally one-to-one and reversible and is another difference between this
model and Yamamoto’s [5] model.
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The code described in this section satisfies the following inequalities for δ > 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Pr{XK 6= G(VX , VCX , VCY )} ≤ δ (4.5)
Pr{Y K 6= G(VY , VCX , VCY )} ≤ δ (4.6)
H(VX , VCX) ≤ H(XK) + δ (4.7)
H(VY , VCY ) ≤ H(Y K) + δ (4.8)
H(VX , VY , VCY ) ≤ H(XK , Y K) + δ (4.9)
H(XK |VX , VY ) ≥ H(VCX)− δ (4.10)
H(XK |VCX , VCY ) ≥ H(VX)− δ (4.11)
H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY ) ≥ H(VX)− δ (4.12)
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H(VCX) +H(VX)− δ ≤ H(XK |VCY , VY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VCY ) + δ (4.13)
where G is a function to define the decoding process at the receiver. It can intuitively
be seen from (4.7) and (4.8) that X and Y are recovered from the corresponding private
information and the common information produced by XK and Y K . Equations (4.7)
- (4.9) show that the private information and common information produced by each
source should contain no redundancy. It is also seen from (4.11) and (4.12) that VY is
independent of XK asymptotically. Here, (VX , VY ) and VCX or VCY are asymptotically
disjoint, which ensures that no redundant information is sent to the decoder.
Yamamoto [5] proved that a common information between XK and Y K is represented
by the mutual information I(X;Y ). Yamamoto [5] also defined two kinds of common
information. The first common information is defined as the rate of the attainable
minimum core by removing each private information, which is independent of the other
information, from (XK , Y K) as much as possible. The second common information is
defined as the rate of the attainable maximum core such that if we lose this quantity then
the uncertainty of X and Y becomes the entropy of the common information between
the sources. Here, the common information that VCX and VCY represent is considered.
The relationship between the common information portions is now demonstrated by
constructing the prototype code (WX , WY , WCX , WCY ) as per Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: For any 0 ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K, there exits a code WX = FX(XK),
WY = FY (Y
K), WCX = FCX(X
K), WCY = FCY (Y
K), X̂K , Ŷ K = G(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ),
where WX ∈ IMX , WY ∈ IMY , WCX ∈ IMCX , WCY ∈ IMCY for IMα, which is defined
as {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}, that satisfies,
Pr{X̂K , Ŷ K 6= XK , Y K} ≤  (4.14)
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H(X|Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WX) ≤ 1
K
logMX ≤ H(X|Y ) + 0 (4.15)
H(Y |X)− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WY ) ≤ 1
K
logMY ≤ H(Y |X) + 0 (4.16)
I(X;Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
(H(WCX) +H(WCY ))
≤ 1
K
(logMCX + logMCY ) ≤ I(X;Y ) + 0 (4.17)
1
K
H(XK |WY ) ≥ H(X)− 0 (4.18)
1
K
H(Y K |WX) ≥ H(Y )− 0 (4.19)
We can see that (4.15) - (4.17) mean
H(X,Y )− 30 ≤ 1
K
(H(WX) +H(WY ) +H(WCX)
+ H(WCY ))
≤ H(X,Y ) + 30 (4.20)
Hence from (4.14), (4.20) and the ordinary source coding theorem, (WX , WY , WCX ,
WCY ) have no redundancy for sufficiently small 0 ≥ 0. It can also be seen that WX
and WY are independent of Y
K and XK respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1. As seen by Slepian and Wolf, mentioned by Yamamoto [5] there
exist MX codes for the PY |X(y|x) DMC (discrete memoryless channel) and MY codes
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for the PX|Y (x|y) DMC. The codeword sets exist as CXi and CYj , where CXi is a subset
of the typical sequence of XK and CYj is a subset of the typical sequence of Y
K . The
encoding functions are similar, and here one decoding function has been created as there
is one decoder at the receiver:
fXi : IMCX → CXi (4.21)
fY j : IMCY → CYj (4.22)
g : XK , Y K → IMCX × IMCY (4.23)
The relations for (MX , MY ) and the common information remains the same as per
Yamamoto’s and will therefore not be proven here.
In this scheme, the average (VCX , VCY ) transmitted is used for many codewords from X
and Y . Thus, at any time either VCX or VCY is transmitted. Over time, the split between
which common information portion is transmitted is determined and the protocol is
prearranged accordingly. Therefore all the common information is either transmitted as
l or m, and as such Yamamoto’s encoding and decoding method may be used.
As per Yamamoto’s method the code does exist and WX and WY are asymptotically
independent of Y and X respectively, as shown by Yamamoto [5].
The common information is important in this model as the sum of VCX and VCY repre-
sent a common information between the sources. The following theorem holds for this
common information:
Theorem 1:
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )] = I(X;Y ) (4.24)
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where VCX is the common portion between X
K and Y K produced by XK and VCY is
the common portion between XK and Y K produced by Y K . It is noted that the (4.24)
holds asymptotically, and does not hold with equality when K is finite. Here, we show
the approximation when K is infinitely large. The private portions for XK and Y K
are represented as VX and VY respectively. As explained in Yamamoto’s [5] Theorem
1, two types of common information exist (the first is represented by I(X;Y ) and the
second by min(H(XK), H(Y K)). Here part of this idea is developed to show that the
sum of the common information portions produced by XK and Y K in this new model
is represented by the mutual information between the sources.
Proof of Theorem 1. The first part is to prove that H(VCX) +H(VCY ) ≥ I(X;Y ). The
conditions (4.5) and (4.6) are weakened to the following:
Pr {XK , Y K 6= GXY (VX , VY , VCX , VCY }) ≤ δ1 (4.25)
For any (VX ,VY , VCX , VCY ) ∈ C(30) (which can be seen from (4.20)), from (4.25) and
the ordinary source coding theorem that the following results:
H(XK , Y K)− δ1 ≤ 1
K
H(VX , VY , VCX , VCY )
≤ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VY ) +H(VCX)
+ H(VCY )] (4.26)
where δ1 → 0 as δ → 0. From Lemma 1,
1
K
H(VY |XK) ≥ 1
K
H(VY )− δ (4.27)
1
K
H(VX |Y K) ≥ 1
K
H(VX)− δ (4.28)
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From (4.26) - (4.28),
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )] ≥ H(X,Y )− 1
K
H(VX)
− 1
K
H(VY )− δ1
≥ H(X,Y )− 1
K
H(VX |Y K)
− 1
K
H(VY |XK)− δ1 − 2δ (4.29)
On the other hand, we can see that
1
K
H(XK , VY ) ≤ H(X,Y ) + δ (4.30)
This implies that
1
K
H(VY |XK) ≤ H(Y |X) + δ (4.31)
and
1
K
H(VX |Y K) ≤ H(X|Y ) + δ (4.32)
From (4.29), (4.31) and (4.32) we get
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )] ≥ H(X,Y )−H(X|Y )−H(Y |X)
− δ1 − 4δ
= I(X;Y )− δ1 − 4δ (4.33)
It is possible to see from (4.17) that H(VCX) + H(VCY ) ≤ I(X;Y ). From this result,
(4.23) and (4.33), and as δ1 → 0 and δ → 0 it can be seen that
1
K
[H(VCX +H(VCY )] = I(X;Y ) (4.34)
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This model can cater for a scenario where a particular source, say X needs to be more
secure than Y (possibly because of eavesdropping on the X channel). In such a case,
the 1KH(VCX) term in (4.33) needs to be as high as possible. When this uncertainty is
increased then the security of X increases.
In order to determine the security of the system, a measure for the amount of information
leaked has been developed. This is a new notation and quantification, which contributes
to the novelty of this work. The obtained information and total uncertainty are used
to determine the leaked information. Information leakage is indicated by LPQ, where P
indicates the source/s for which information leakage is being quantified and Q indicates
the sequence that has been wiretapped.
The information leakage bounds for the following cases are indicated in (4.35) - (4.38):
• Leakage on X when (VX , VY ) is wiretapped
• Leakage on X when (VCX , VCY ) is wiretapped
• Leakage on X when (VCX , VCY , VY ) is wiretapped
LX
K
VX ,VY
≤ H(XK)−H(VCX)−H(VCY ) + δ (4.35)
LX
K
VCX ,VCY
≤ H(XK)−H(VX)−H(VCY ) + δ (4.36)
LX
K
VCX ,VCY ,VY
≤ H(XK)−H(VX)−H(VCY ) + δ (4.37)
H(VCY )− δ ≤ LXKVY ,VCY
≤ H(XK)−H(VCX)−H(VX) + δ (4.38)
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Here, VY is private information of source Y
K and is independent of XK and therefore
does not leak any information about XK , shown in (4.36) and (4.37). Equation (4.38)
gives an indication of the minimum and maximum amount of leaked information for
the interesting case where a syndrome has been wiretapped and the information leakage
quantification on the alternate source is considered. The outstanding common infor-
mation component is the maximum information that can be leaked. For this case, the
common information VCX and VCY can thus consist of added protection to reduce the
amount of information leaked. These bounds developed in (4.35) - (4.38) are proven in
the next section.
The proofs for the above mentioned information leakage inequalities are now detailed.
First, the inequalities in (4.10) - (4.13) will be proven, so as to prove that the informa-
tion leakage equations hold.
Proof for (4.10):
1
K
H(XK |VX , VY )
=
1
K
[H(XK , VX , VY )−H(VX , VY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VY )−H(VX , VY )] (4.39)
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) + I(XK ;VY ) +H(VY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VX |VY ) + I(VX ;VY ) +H(VY |VX)]
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) +H(VY |XK)−H(VX |VY )
−H(VY |VX)]
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(VY )−H(VX)−H(VY )] (4.40)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VX)]
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VX)]− δ
=
1
K
[H(VCX) +H(VCY )]− δ (4.41)
where (4.39) holds because VX is a function of X and (4.40) holds because X is inde-
pendent of VY asymptotically and VX is independent of VY asymptotically.
Chapter 4. Information Leakage for Multiple Correlated Sources using Slepian-Wolf
Coding 59
For the proofs of (4.11) and (4.12), the following simplification for H(X|VCY ) is used:
H(XK |VCY ) = H(XK , Y K)−H(VCY )
= H(XK) +H(VCY )− I(X;VCY )−H(VCY )
= H(XK) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )−H(VCY )
+ δ1 (4.42)
= H(XK)−H(VCY ) + δ1 (4.43)
where I(X;VCY ) approximately equal to H(VCY ) in (4.42) can be seen intuitively from
the Venn diagram in Figure 4.3. Since it is an approximation, δ1, which is smaller than
δ in the proofs below has been added to cater for the tolerance.
Proof for (4.11):
1
K
H(XK |VCX , VCY )
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCX , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )] (4.44)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) + I(X;VCY )
+ H(VCY |XK)]− 1
K
[H(VCX |VCY )
+ I(VCX ;VCY ) +H(VCY |VCX)] + δ1
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) +H(VCY )−H(VCX)
− H(VCY )] + δ1 (4.45)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )−H(VCX)] + δ1
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )
− H(VCX)]− δ
=
1
K
H(VX) + δ1 − δ (4.46)
where (4.44) holds because VCX is a function of X
K and (4.45) holds because X is
independent of VCY asymptotically and VCX is independent of VCY asymptotically.
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The proof for H(X|VCX , VCY , VY ) is similar to that for H(X|VCX , VCY ), because VY is
independent of X.
Proof for (4.12):
1
K
H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY )
=
1
K
H(XK |VCX , VCY ) (4.47)
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCX , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY )−H(VCX , VCY )] (4.48)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) + I(X;VCY ) +H(VCY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VCX |VCY ) + I(VCX ;VCY ) +H(VCY |VCX)]
+ δ1
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY ) +H(VCY )−H(VCX)
− H(VCY )] + δ1 (4.49)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )−H(VCX)] + δ1
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )
− −H(VCX)]− δ + δ1
=
1
K
H(VX)− δ + δ1 (4.50)
where (4.48) holds because VCX is a function of X
K and (4.49) holds because XK is
independent of VCY asymptotically and VCX is independent of VCY asymptotically.
For the proof of (4.13), the following probabilities are considered:
Pr{VX , VCX 6= G(TX)} ≤ δ (4.51)
Pr{VY , VCY 6= G(TY )} ≤ δ (4.52)
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1
K
H(XK |TY )
≤ 1
K
H(XK , VCY , VY )] + δ (4.53)
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY , VY )−H(VCY , VY )] + δ
=
1
K
[H(XK , VY )−H(VCY , VY )] + δ (4.54)
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) + I(XK ;VY ) +H(VY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VCY |VY ) + I(VCY ;VY ) +H(VY |VCY )] + δ
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(VY )−H(VCY )−H(VY )] + δ (4.55)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )] + δ (4.56)
where (4.53) holds from (4.52), (4.54) holds because VCY and VY are asymptotically
independent. Furthermore, (4.55) holds because VCY and VY are asymptotically inde-
pendent and XK and VY are asymptotically independent.
Following a similar proof to those done above in this section, another bound forH(XK |VCY , VY )
can be found as follows:
1
K
H(XK |VCY , VY )
=
1
K
[H(XK , VCY , VY )−H(VCY , VY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK , VY )−H(VCY , VY )] (4.57)
=
1
K
[H(XK |VY ) + I(XK ;VY ) +H(VY |XK)]
− 1
K
[H(VCY |VY ) + I(VCY ;VY ) +H(VY |VCY )]
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(VY )−H(VCY )−H(VY )] (4.58)
=
1
K
[H(XK)−H(VCY )]
≥ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )−H(VCY )]− δ
=
1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX)]− δ (4.59)
where (4.57) holds because VCY and VY are asymptotically independent and (4.58) holds
because VCY and VY are asymptotically independent.
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Since the information leakage is considered as the total information obtained subtracted
from the total uncertainty, the following holds for the four cases considered in this
section:
LX
K
VX ,VY
= H(XK)−H(XK |VX , VY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VCX)−H(VCY ) + δ (4.60)
which proves (4.35).
LX
K
VCX ,VCY
= H(XK)−H(XK |VCX , VCY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VX) + δ (4.61)
which proves (4.36).
LX
K
VCX ,VCY ,VY
= H(XK)−H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VX) + δ (4.62)
which proves (4.37).
The two bounds for H(VCY , VY ) are given by (4.56) and (4.59). From (4.56):
LX
K
VY ,VCY
≥ H(XK)− [H(X)−H(VCY ) + δ]
≥ H(VCY )− δ (4.63)
and from (4.59):
LX
K
VY ,VCY
≤ H(XK)− (H(VX) +H(VCX)− δ)
≤ H(XK)−H(VX)−H(VCX) + δ (4.64)
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Combining these results from (4.63) and (4.64) gives (4.38).
This section details one method for analyzing the security of the system. The Shannon
cipher system, which is used to determine transmission and key rate bounds for perfect
secrecy is another avenue explored and the approach follows in the next section.
4.3 Shannon’s Cipher System Approach For Multiple Cor-
related Sources
This section details a novel masking method to minimize the key length and thereafter
incorporates Shannon’s cipher system with the multiple correlated source model.
The masking method encompasses masking the conditional entropy portion with a mu-
tual information portion. By masking, certain information is hidden and it becomes
more difficult to obtain the information that has been masked. Masking can typically
be done using random numbers, however the need for random numbers that represent
keys is eliminated. Here a common information is used to mask with.
The following assumptions are made:
• The capacity of each link cannot be exhausted using this method.
• A common information is used to mask certain private information. Further,
private information that needs to be masked always exists in this method.
The allocation of common information for transmission is done on an arbitrary basis.
The objective of this subsection is to minimize the key lengths while achieving perfect
secrecy.
The private information for source i is given by H(Si|S\Si) according to (4.1), which
is called WSi and the common information associated with source Si is given by WCSi .
First, choose a common information with which to mask. Then take a part of WSi , i.e.
WSi
′
, that has entropy equal to H(WCSi) and mask as follows:
W
′
Si ⊕WCSi (4.65)
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When the exclusive-or of the two sequences is performed the result is a single sequence
that may look different to the original sequences. Thereafter the masked portion is
transmitted instead of the W
′
Si
portion when transmitting WSi thus providing added
security. If Y is secure then this common information can be transmitted along Y ’s
channel, which ensures the information is kept secure. The ability to mask using the
common information is a unique and interesting feature of this new model for multiple
correlated sources. The underlying principle is that the secure link should transmit more
common information after transmitting the private information.
The lower bound for the channel rate when the masking approach is used is given by:
RMi ≥ H(S1, . . . , Sn)−
n∑
t=2
∑
all possible St
(t− 1)I(St|Sct) (4.66)
where RMi is the ith channel rate when masking is used.
The method works theoretically but may result in some concern practically as there
may be a security compromise when common information is sent across non secure
links. If the WCSi component used for masking has been compromised then the private
portion it masked will also be compromised. A method to overcome this involves using
two common information parts for masking. Equation (4.65) representing the masking
would become:
W
′
Si ⊕WCSi ⊕WCSj (4.67)
where i 6= j and both WCSi and WCSj are common information associated with source
Si. This way, if only WCSj is compromised then WSi is not compromised as it is still
protected by WCSi . Here, combinations of common information are used to increase the
security.
The Shannon’s cipher system for this multiple source model is now presented in order
to determine the rate regions for perfect secrecy. The multiple sources each have their
own encoder and there is a universal decoder. Each source has an encoder represented
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by:
Ei : S × IWSi → IWCSi = {0, 1, . . . ,WSi − 1}
IWCSi = {0, 1, . . . ,WCSi − 1} (4.68)
where IWSi is the alphabet representing the private portion for source Si and IWCSi is
the alphabet representing the common information for source Si. The decoder at the
receiver is defined as:
D : (IWSi , IWCSi ) × IMk → S (4.69)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
Wi = FEi(Si,Wki) (4.70)
Ŝi = FDi(Wi,Wki,W{kp}) (4.71)
where p = 1, . . . , n, p 6= i and W{kp} represents the set of common information required
to determine Si, and Ŝi is the decoded output.
The following conditions should be satisfied for the general cases:
1
K
logWSi ≤ Ri +  (4.72)
1
K
logMki ≤ Rki +  (4.73)
Pr{Ŝi 6= Si} ≤  (4.74)
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1
K
H(Si|Wi) ≤ hi −  (4.75)
1
K
H(Sj |Wi) ≤ hj −  (4.76)
where Ri is the the rate of source Si’s channel and Rki is the key rate of Si. The
security levels, for source i and any other source j are measured uncertainties hi and hj
respectively.
The general cases considered are:
Case 1: When TSi is leaked and Si needs to be kept secret.
Case 2: When TSi is leaked and Sj needs to be kept secret.
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as follows:
Definition 1a: (Ri, Rki, hi) is admissible for case 1 if there exists a code (FEi , FD) such
that (4.72) - (4.75) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj , hi, hj) is admissible for case 2 if there exists a code
(FEi , FD) such that (4.72) - (4.74) and (4.76) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions are defined as:
R(hi) = {(Ri, Rki) :
(Ri, Rki, hi) is admissible for case 1} (4.77)
R(hi, hj) = {(Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj) :
(Ri, Rki, Rj , Rkj , hj) is admissible for case 2} (4.78)
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The admissible regions give an indication of the rate regions for this scenario. The regions
are derived for the more specific cases in Chapters 5-6, which are developed using this
method. The information leakage described in the Slepian-Wolf aspect indicates the
common information that should be secured to ensure less information leakage.
4.4 Shannon’s Cipher System Approach for Two Corre-
lated Sources
The Shannon’s cipher system approach for two independent correlated sources (depicted
in Figure 4.4) is detailed in this section. The source outputs are i.i.d random variables
X and Y , taking on values in the finite sets X and Y. Both the transmitter and receiver
have access to the key, a random variable, independent of XK and Y K and taking values
in IMk = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Mk − 1}. The sources XK and Y K compute the ciphertexts W1
and W2, which are the result of specific encryption functions on the plaintext from X
and Y respectively. The encryption functions are invertible, thus knowing W1 and the
corresponding key kX , X can be retrieved. The key for Y is represented as kY .
The mutual information between the plaintext and ciphertext should be small so that
the wiretapper cannot gain much information about the plaintext. For perfect secrecy,
this mutual information should be zero, then the length of the key should be at least
the length of the plaintext.
The encoder functions for X and Y , (EX and EY respectively) are given as:
EX : XK × IMkX → IM ′X = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
X − 1}
IM ′CX = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
CX − 1} (4.79)
EY : YK × IMkY → IM ′Y = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
Y − 1}
IM ′CY = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
CY − 1} (4.80)
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Figure 4.4: Shannon cipher system for two correlated sources
The decoder is defined as:
DXY : (IM ′X , IM
′
Y
, IM ′CX , IM
′
CY
) × IMkX , IMkY
→ XK × YK (4.81)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
W1 = FEX (X
K ,WkX) (4.82)
W2 = FEY (Y
K ,WkY ) (4.83)
X̂K = FDX (W1,W2,WkX) (4.84)
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Ŷ K = FDY (W1,W2,WkY ) (4.85)
or
(X̂K , Ŷ K) = FDXY (W1,W2,WkX ,WkY ) (4.86)
The following conditions should be satisfied for cases 1- 4:
1
K
logMX ≤ RX +  (4.87)
1
K
logMY ≤ RY +  (4.88)
1
K
logMkX ≤ RkX +  (4.89)
1
K
logMkY ≤ RkY +  (4.90)
Pr{X̂K 6= XK} ≤  (4.91)
Pr{Ŷ K 6= Y K} ≤  (4.92)
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1
K
H(XK |W1) ≤ hX +  (4.93)
1
K
H(Y K |W2) ≤ hY +  (4.94)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  (4.95)
where RX is the rate of source X’s channel and RY is the rate of source Y ’s channel.
Here, (RkX , RkY ) is the rate of the key channel when allocating a key to X and Y . The
security level for X and Y are measured by the total and individual uncertainties, hXY
and (hX , hY ) respectively.
The cases 1 - 3 that are considered are as follows:
Case 1: When (W1,W2) is leaked and (X
K , Y K) needs to be kept secret. The security
level of concern is represented by 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2).
Case 2: When (W1,W2) is leaked and (X
K , Y K) needs to be kept secret. The security
level of concern is represented by ( 1KH(X
K |W1,W2), 1KH(Y K |W1,W2)).
Case 3: When (W1,W2) is leaked and Y
K needs to be kept secret.The security level of
concern is represented by 1KH(Y
K |W1,W2).
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as follows:
Definition 1a: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1 if there exists a code
(FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY , FDXY ) such that (4.87) - (4.92) and (4.95) hold for any → 0
and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2 if there exists a
code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY , FDXY ) such that (4.87) - (4.94) hold for any  → 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Definition 1c: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3 if there exists a code
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(FEY , FDXY ) such that (4.87) - (4.92) and (4.94) hold for any  → 0 and sufficiently
large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions of Rj for case j are defined as:
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1} (4.96)
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2} (4.97)
R3(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3} (4.98)
Theorems for these regions have been developed:
Theorem 2: For 0 ≤ hXY ≤ H(X,Y ),
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY } (4.99)
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Theorem 3: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X) and 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y ),
R2(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY )} (4.100)
When hX = 0 then case 3 can be reduced to that depicted in (4.100). Hence, Corollary
1 follows:
Corollary 1: For 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y ), R3(hY ) = R2(0, hY )
The direct and converse parts of the proofs for (4.99) and (4.100) are contained in
Appendix A.
4.5 Information Leakage for the System using Matrix Par-
titions
In this section the aim is to determine the equivocation (uncertainty) in retrieving a
message from the transmitted channel information. The convention used by Stankovic
et al. [58] is followed to present an example together with a method incorporating
generator matrix ranks put forth by Luo et al. [47] to determine the equivocation. The
Hamming distance is represented as follows: dH(X
K , Y K) ≤ 1.
The following generator matrix G is used:
G =

1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1

The matrix takes the form: G = [IkP
T ] and here Ik is the identity matrix of order k
and P T is made up of two 2× 3 matrices in this case.
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Suppose the messages to send across the channels for X and Y are given by: x =
[a1 v1 q1] = [10 11 001] and y = [u2 a2 q2] = [10 11 011].
There is compression along X’s and Y ’s channel. As per the matrix partition method
the syndrome for X and Y is comprised of:
TX =
 vT1
P T1 a
T
1 ⊕ qT1

TY =
 uT2
P T2 a
T
2 ⊕ qT2

where P T1 is the G matrix transpose of rows 1-2 and columns 5-7 and P
T
2 is the G matrix
transpose of rows 3-4 and columns 5-7. The generator matrices used by X and Y to
achieve these syndromes are GX and GY respectively.
GX =

0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

GY =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

This results in syndromes of [1 1 1 0 0] for X and [1 0 1 1 1] for Y .
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Here, the equivocation for these cases can be found using the G matrix specified above
and a sub matrix of G. This follows from Luo et al. [47], where the equivocation is given
by: 4Y |TY = rank(G)− rank(GY ). Here, 4Y |TY is the equivocation on Y given TY .
Next, the information leakage for each of the following cases is analyzed:
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY ) is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when TX is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when TY is leaked
In order to show the most representative results for each of the cases the scenarios
contributing to the minimum and maximum information leakage have been considered.
Before the information leakage method is described certain variables are introduced.
Here, µTX and µTY represent the number of wiretapped bits from TX and TY respectively.
The length of the information bits from each syndrome is represented as lXi and l
Y
i for
XK and Y K respectively. The length of parity bits with respect to XK or Y K is denoted
as lp, and the following can be developed: l
X
i + l
Y
i + 2lp is the overall length of TX and
TY . Hence we have: 0 ≤ µTX ≤ lXi + lp and 0 ≤ µTY ≤ lYi + lp.
Note that the leakage is determined using a combination of the information bits, parity
bits and the parity matrix H rank. The H matrix rank is used to determine how much of
information is leaked from the wiretapped bits when the columns corresponding to the
wiretapped bits have been removed. Let H ′ denote the H matrix with the wiretapped
columns removed.
The case for the leakage on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY ) is leaked is now considered. Ini-
tially the maximum leakage is described. When µTX ≤ lXi and µTY ≤ lYi , the maximum
leakage is µTX + µTY + rank(H) − rank(H ′). This considers when the information bits
(namely v1 and u2) have been leaked only.
For this example the syndromes can leak a maximum of two information bits each, and
a combined leakage of four bits. For each information bit wiretapped there is one bit
of information leaked about XK and Y K . Since the rank of H ′ remains as three for
when each of these bits are wiretapped, the information leakage is determined by the
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information bits entirely. This can be seen in the maximum case in Figure 4.6 for the
first four wiretapped bits.
Next, µTX > l
X
i and µTY > l
Y
i is considered. This case considers when more than the
information bits are wiretapped. For this case min(µTX−lXi , µTY −lYi ) parity bits can be
from the corresponding positions in P T1 a
T
1 ⊕qT1 and P T2 aT2 ⊕qT2 . Therefore, the maximum
leakage is as indicated in (4.101).
lXi + l
Y
i + µTX + min(µTX − lXi , µTY − lYi ) + rank(H)− rank(H ′) (4.101)
If µTX > l
X
i and µTY ≤ lYi the maximum leakage is µTY + lXi + rank(H)− rank(H ′); if
µTX ≤ lXi and µTY > lYi , the maximum leakage is µTX + lYi + rank(H)− rank(H ′).
The parity bits only leak information about XK and Y K when the positions wiretapped
correspond. If the last parity bit in TX is wiretapped and the last parity bit in TY is
wiretapped then since these wiretapped bits are in corresponding positions there will be
one bit leaked about XK and Y K . As such, for the maximum leakage the parity bits
should be placed in corresponding positions, as indicated by the ’x’ positions in Figure
4.5. For this example the information leakage between 5 - 10 wiretapped bits increases
by one bit for every two bits wiretapped. This is because these are the parity bits of
concern and there is one bit of information leaked for every pair of corresponding parity
bits wiretapped. The rank of H ′ also increases by one for every two bits wiretapped for
these 5 - 10 wiretapped bits. Thus the information leakage increases by one for every
pair of parity bits and by a further one for every pair of parities as there is a change at
these points in the H ′ matrix rank.
Now the minimum leakage is considered. When µTX ≤ lp and µTY ≤ lp, the minimum
leakage is max(0, µTX +µTY − lp) + rank(H)− rank(H ′). This considers when the parity
bits (namely P T1 a
T
1 ⊕qT1 and P T2 aT2 ⊕qT2 ) have been leaked only. Otherwise, the minimum
leakage is µTX + µTY − lp + rank(H)− rank(H ′).
To achieve the minimum information leakage the wiretapped parity bits should not
correspond, which is shown by the ’o’ positions in Figure 4.5. This means that three
bits may be wiretapped (all parity and not corresponding bits, for example all of TX ’s
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T
2 ⊕ qT2
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T
1 ⊕ qT1
Information bits Parity bits
Figure 4.5: Wiretapped parity bits for maximum and minimum information leakage
parity bits) before the information leakage starts. The fourth wiretapped bit could
match a corresponding parity bit or be an information bit; both of which will result in
one bit of information leakage. The same follows for the fifth to seventh wiretapped
bits. When the eighth bit is wiretapped the minimum case is where all the parity bits
correspond (i.e. 6 bits) and there are two information bits wiretapped; at this point
the information leakage rises by two bits. Until this point the rank of H ′ was three,
hence it would not affect the information leakage. An additional one bit of information
leakage when this eighth bit is wiretapped comes from the rank of H ′ changing by one.
Thereafter there are two bits of information leakage for each wiretapped bit. This comes
from the one information bit leaked and the rank of H ′ increasing by one for each of the
ninth and tenth wiretapped bits. This is depicted as the minimum case in Figure 4.6.
Next the information leakage for the second and third cases are determined. The leakage
for these cases reach the same limit for the minimum and maximum cases of information
leakage, however the information leakage peak occurs at different points depending on
which bits (information or parity) are leaked first. The leakage for the second and third
cases respectively are as follows: LX
K ,Y K
TX
= lXi and L
XK ,Y K
TY
= lYi . Using the numerical
example for this section, the graphical representation is in Figure 4.7. If the parity bits
of either TX or TY are wiretapped, then there is no information leakage as there are no
corresponding parity bits to match with and to allow for information leakage. This is
shown in Figure 4.7 as the wiretapped bits 3-5 for the maximum case and the wiretapped
bits 1-3 for the minimum case. When the information bits are wiretapped there is one
bit of leakage for each information bit, thus resulting in two bits of leakage when both
information bits from TX or TY have been wiretapped. This is shown in Figure 4.7
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Figure 4.6: The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY ) has been wire-
tapped
as the wiretapped bits 1-2 for the maximum case and the wiretapped bits 4-5 for the
minimum case. The maximum case depicted is when the information bits are initially
wiretapped and the minimum case is where the parity bits are initially wiretapped.
In this example certain bits have more equivocation than others and as such which bits
are wiretapped plays a role in making the system vulnerable at different times. For
instance, following from the third case if only TY is wiretapped from the parity bits
then for the first 3 bits there is no information leakage due to TY as the wiretapper
would have encountered the masked bits. The information leakage occurs after the third
bit, when u2 is wiretapped. This therefore shows an upper and lower bound on the
uncertainty, where the upper bound is given when bits u2 is leaked first and the lower
bound is given when the masked portion is first leaked. The parity bits are masked and
are thus more difficult to be leaked to an adversary. Parity bits from both sources need
to be wiretapped and in the same positions in order to leak information.
In general, for a systematic code the columns that have a weight of one would contribute
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Figure 4.7: The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when TX or TY has been wire-
tapped
one bit to the information leakage entirely. With use of the matrix partition approach,
if the parity bits of both TX and TY are wiretapped (and these bits are from the same
columns in each generator matrix) then for every two parity bits wiretapped there is one
bit of information leaked. The parity bits and the information bits can also be used to
solve the parity matrix to determine the information leakage. If the wiretapped parity
bits do not belong to the same columns then there is no information leakage at that
point.
This chapter introduces a multiple correlated source model followed by a novel two
correlated source model. The security aspects of the two correlated source model has
been analyzed and a masking method to reduce on the length of keys required has been
presented. The security aspects make use of existing techniques using the Slepian-Wolf
scenario and Shannon’s cipher system approach to show the information leakage bounds
for the novel model and rate regions required to achieve perfect secrecy respectively. The
chapter ends with an aspect showing the coding approach that demonstrates practical
implementation for such a model.
Chapter 5
Information Leakage of
Slepian-Wolf Encoded Sequences
for Two Correlated Sources with
Partially Predetermined
Information
This chapter describes a novel two correlated source model where some source infor-
mation has been leaked to a wiretapper. It caters for applications used in degraded
broadcast channels and scenarios where there is pre-existing information available to an
eavesdropper. This model is a variation of the two correlated source model investigated
in the previous chapter. Here a main contribution is the development of the two corre-
lated source model. The two approaches explored to investigate the information leakage
have been used here; one quantifying the information leakage for the Slepian-Wolf sce-
nario and the other incorporating Shannon’s cipher system. These security aspects of
the two correlated source model is also a contribution. The chapter again ends with a
section showing the coding implementation for this model, which is an important contri-
bution as it shows practical implementation for the novel model developed and provides
an important link between the information theory and coding theory fields.
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5.1 Two Correlated Source Model with Partially Prede-
termined Information
The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X and Y are mutually correlated
random variables, depicted in Figure 5.1. The alphabet sets for sources X and Y are
represented by X and Y respectively. Assume that (XK , Y K) are encoded into two
syndromes (TX and TY ). The compressed representation is as follows: TX = (VX , VCX)
and TY = (VY , VCY ) where TX and TY are the syndromes of X and Y . Here, TX and TY
are characterized by (VX , VCX) and (VY , VCY ) respectively. The Venn diagram in Figure
4.3 may again be used to illustrate this idea where it is shown that VX and VY represent
the private information of sources X and Y respectively and VCX and VCY represent
the common information between XK and Y K generated by XK and Y K respectively.
Each source is composed of two components; XK1 and XK2 for XK and Y K1 and Y K2
for Y K , of which one component is leaked to the eavesdropper. Here, the lengths K1
and K2 are related to K as follows: K1 +K2 = K. Due to the stationary nature of the
sources, if Y K2 is known by the wiretapper then it corresponds to XK2 known about
XK as the wiretapper has access to certain common information between the sources.
XK Y K
TYTX
XˆK , Yˆ K
Encoder Encoder
Decoder
k
XK1 XK2 Y K1 Y K2
Wiretapper
Figure 5.1: Correlated source coding for two sources with a more powerful adversary
In the same way as was described for the two correlated source model presented in Chap-
ter 4, the correlated sources X and Y transmit messages (in the form of syndromes) to
the receiver along the wiretapped links. The decoder determines X and Y only after
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receiving all of TX and TY . The eavesdropper has access to either the common or private
portion represented by (TX , TY ) and some data symbols from the corresponding source
(Y K2). The effect is that the eavesdropper has access to some compressed information
(that is transmitted across the communication link after encoding) and some uncom-
pressed information (i.e. the source’s data symbols). There is a mapping/function that
describes the relation between the uncompressed information and the compressed in-
formation. This implies that certain source bits correspond to certain compressed bits
transmitted as channel information. It is valuable to determine how much of informa-
tion the eavesdropper has access to when wiretapping the private or common information
portions (this is described in the next section).
Here, typical set encoding and decoding is used. We are able to determine bin indices
for the jointly typical sequence from the indices passed over the communication channel.
When common or private information from a particular link is wiretapped it gives an
indication of which rows/columns in the specific look up table the sequence is contained
within. With additional information the uncertainty of which row/column to look to for
the codeword is reduced as it helps to narrow the number of possible codewords. In this
way, all the codewords having the same sequence as the wiretapped source bits will be
shortlisted codewords.
The code described in this section satisfies the following inequalities for δ > 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Pr{X 6= G(VX , VCX , VCY )} ≤ δ (5.1)
Pr{Y 6= G(VY , VCX , VCY )} ≤ δ (5.2)
H(VX , VCX , VCY ) ≤ H(X) + δ (5.3)
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H(VY , VCX , VCY ) ≤ H(Y ) + δ (5.4)
H(VX , VY , VCX , VCY ) ≤ H(X,Y ) + δ (5.5)
H(XK |VX , VY ) ≥ H(VCX) +H(VCY )− δ (5.6)
H(XK |VCX , VCY ) ≥ H(VX) +H(VCY )− δ (5.7)
H(XK |VCX , VCY , VY ) ≥ H(VX) +H(VCY )− δ (5.8)
H(VCX) +H(VX)− δ ≤ H(XK |VCY , VY )
≤ H(XK)−H(VCY ) + δ (5.9)
where G is a function to define the decoding process at the receiver. It can intuitively
be seen from (5.3) and (5.4) that X and Y are recovered from the corresponding private
information and the common information produced by XK and Y K . Equations (5.3),
(5.4) and (5.5) show that the private information and common information produced by
each source should contain no redundancy.
The prototype code described in Lemma 1 in Section 4.2 and the encoding and decoding
methods are also applied in this section.
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In order to determine the security of the system, the measure introduced in Section 4.2
for the amount of information leaked is used. The obtained information subtracted from
the total uncertainty is used to determine the information leakage.
The information leakage bounds for the following cases are provided in (5.10) - (5.12):
• Leakage on Y when (VY , Y K2) is wiretapped
• Leakage on Y when (VCY , Y K2) is wiretapped
• Leakage on X when (VCY , Y K2) is wiretapped
LY
K
VY ,Y
K2
≤ H(Y K |XK)−H(VY ) + I(VY ;Y K)
+ H(Y K2 |VY ) + δ (5.10)
LY
K
VCY ,Y
K2
≤ H(Y K |XK)−H(VY ) + I(VCY ;Y K)
+ H(Y K2 |VCY ) + δ (5.11)
LX
K
VCY ,Y
K2
≤ H(XK |Y K)−H(VX)
+ I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY ) + I(VCY ;XK)
+ δ (5.12)
As indicated in Figure 5.1, Y K2 is used to represent the source bits that have been
wiretapped. This could be common information that relates to XK or private infor-
mation of XK . Equation (5.12) gives an indication of the minimum and maximum
amount of leaked information for the interesting case where the channel information
and data symbols have been wiretapped and its information leakage on the alternate
source is quantified. This is interesting because intuitively it is known that there is some
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information that may be leaked by an alternate source. For this case, the common infor-
mation VCX and VCY can thus be secured to reduce the amount of information leaked.
The bounds developed in (5.10) - (5.12) are proven below. These are also described in
[62].
The code (VX , VCX , VCY , VY ) that has been defined in Chapter 4 describing the model
exists, and (5.1) - (5.5) satisfy (5.6) - (5.9), which have already been proven in Chapter
4, then the information leakage bounds for this scenario with a more powerful adversary
is given by (5.10) - (5.12).
Proof for (5.10): First, H(Y K |VY , Y K2) is determined.
H(Y K |VY , Y K2)
= H(Y K , VY , Y
K2)−H(VY , Y K2)
= H(Y K) +H(VY |Y K) +H(Y K2 |Y K , VY )
− H(VY , Y K2) (5.13)
= H(Y K) +H(VY )− I(VY ;Y K) +H(Y K2)
− I(Y K2 ;Y K |VY )− I(Y K2 ;VY )−H(VY |Y K2)
− I(VY ;Y K2)−H(Y K2 |VY )
= H(Y K) +H(VY )− I(VY ;Y K) +H(Y K2)
− H(Y K2 |VY )− I(Y K2 ;VY )−H(VY )
+ I(VY ;Y
K2)− I(VY ;Y K2)−H(Y K2)
+ H(Y K2 |VY )
= H(Y K)− I(VY ;Y K)− I(Y K2 ;Y K |VY )
≥ H(VY ) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )− I(VY ;Y K)
− H(Y K2 |VY )− δ (5.14)
= H(VY ) + I(X
K ;Y K)− I(VY ;Y K)−H(Y K2 |VY )
− δ (5.15)
where (5.13) holds from the entropy chain rule, (5.14) holds from (5.4), and (5.15) holds
from Theorem 1.
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The information leakage is thus:
LY
K
VY ,Y
K2
= H(Y K)−H(Y K |VY , Y K2)
≤ H(Y K)−H(VY )− I(XK ;Y K) + I(VY ;Y K)
+ H(Y K2 |VY ) + δ
= H(Y K |XK)−H(VY ) + I(VY ;Y K)
+ H(Y K2 |VY ) + δ (5.16)
which proves (5.10).
Proof for (5.11):
H(Y K |VCY , Y K2)
= H(Y K , VCY , Y
K2)−H(VCY , Y K2)
= H(Y K) +H(VCY |Y K) +H(Y K2 |Y K , VCY )
− [H(VCY |Y K2) + I(VCY ;Y K2)
+ H(Y K2 |VCY )] (5.17)
= H(Y K) +H(VCY )− I(VCY ;Y K) +H(Y K2)
− I(Y K2 ;Y K |VCY )− I(Y K2 ;VCY )
− H(VCY ) + I(VCY ;Y K2)− I(VCY ;Y K2)
− H(Y K2) + I(VCY ;Y K2)
= H(Y K)− I(VCY ;Y K)−H(Y K2 |VCY )
≥ H(VY ) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )
− I(VCY ;Y K)−H(Y K2 |VCY )− δ (5.18)
= H(VY ) + I(X
K ;Y K)− I(VCY ;Y K)
− H(Y K2 |VCY )− δ (5.19)
where (5.17) holds from the entropy chain rule, (5.18) holds from (5.4) and (5.19) holds
from Theorem 1.
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The information leakage is thus:
LY
K
VCY ,Y
K2
= H(Y K)−H(Y K |VCY , Y K2)
≤ H(Y K)−H(VY )− I(XK ;Y K)
+ I(VCY ;Y
K) +H(Y K2 |VCY ) + δ
= H(Y K |XK)−H(VY ) + I(VCY ;Y K)
+ H(Y K2 |VCY ) + δ (5.20)
which proves (5.11).
Following a similar proof to those done above in this section, a bound forH(XK |VCY , VY 2)
can be found as follows:
H(XK |VCY , Y K2)
= H(XK , VCY , Y
K2)−H(VCY , Y K2)
= H(XK) +H(VCY |XK) +H(Y K2 |VCY , XK)
− H(VCY , Y K2) (5.21)
= H(XK) +H(VCY )− I(VCY ;XK) +H(Y K2)
− I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY )− I(Y K2 ;VCY )
− H(VCY |Y K2)− I(VCY ;Y K2)
− H(Y K2 |VCY ) (5.22)
= H(XK) +H(VCY )− I(VCY ;XK) +H(Y K2)
− I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY )− I(Y K2 ;VCY )−H(VCY )
+ I(VCY ;Y
K2)−H(Y K2) + I(VCY ;Y K2)
− I(VCY ;Y K2)
= H(XK)− I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY )− I(VCY ;XK)
≥ H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(VCY )
− I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY )− I(VCY ;XK)− δ (5.23)
= H(VX) + I(X
K ;Y K)− I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY )
− I(VCY ;XK)− δ (5.24)
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where (5.21) and (5.22) results from the chain rule, (5.24) holds from Theorem 1, and
(5.23) holds from (5.3).
The information leakage is thus:
LX
K
VCY ,Y
K2
= H(XK)−H(XK |VCY , Y K2)
≤ H(XK)−H(VX)− I(XK ;Y K)
+ I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY ) + I(VCY ;XK) + δ
= H(XK |Y K)−H(VX) + I(XK ;Y K2 |VCY )
+ I(VCY ;X
K) + δ (5.25)
which proves (5.12).
This section shows the information leakage when various portions of the channel infor-
mation and some source data symbols are leaked. It is evident that the eavesdropper
has more information about a particular source as shown in (5.20)-(5.25), than if only
the channel information was wiretapped. This can be drawn from a comparison with
the previous chapter. The interesting case explored for (5.12) demonstrates that there
is common information leaked about X from the wiretapped Y ’s source symbols or the
syndrome TY , due to the correlation between the sources.
Equation (5.10) in effect means that the information leakage is upper bounded by
the common information between VY and the eavesdropped source data symbols and
H(Y K2 |VY ). The security level is therefore dependent on these portions. If these are
secured then the information leakage will be less.
For (5.11), the common portion between VCY and the eavesdropped source data symbols
together with H(Y K2 |VCY ) form the upper bound for the information leakage. In the
same way as (5.10), increasing the security for these information portions ensures more
information can remain secure.
Again, in (5.12) VCY and the eavesdropped source data symbols, together withH(X
K |VCY )
play a role in leaking information. Since VCY is a common information portion it leaks
at least some information but no more than I(X;Y ) about X.
Equations (5.10) - (5.12) can be verified graphically using Figure 4.3. The wiretapped
information from the link may be redundant information if the source data symbols
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correspond to the same information, which could be less information leaked than if the
source bits and the channel information corresponded to different information.
5.2 Shannon Cipher System Approach for Two Correlated
Sources with Partially Predetermined Information
The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X and Y are mutually correlated
random variables, depicted in Figure 5.2. The alphabet sets for sources X and Y are
represented by X and Y respectively. As in the previous section, assume that (XK ,
Y K) are encoded into two syndromes (TX and TY ). The compressed representation is as
follows: TX = (VX , VCX) and TY = (VY , VCY ) where TX and TY are the syndromes of X
and Y . The characterization of the syndromes remains the same as specified above. Both
the transmitter and receiver have access to the key, a random variable, independent of
XK and Y K and taking values in IMK = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MK−1}. The sources XK and Y K
compute the ciphertexts X
′
and Y
′
, which are the result of specific encryption functions
on the plaintext from X and Y respectively. As described in Chapter 4, the encryption
functions are invertible, thus knowing X
′
and the key, XK can be retrieved.
The eavesdropper has access to either the common or private portions given by TY
and/or TX and some data symbols from the corresponding source (Y
K2). There is a
mapping/function that describes the relation between the uncompressed information and
the compressed information. This implies that certain source bits correspond to certain
compressed bits transmitted as channel information. It is valuable to determine how
much of information to transmit at a time such that the eavesdropper cannot retrieve
the message (this is described in the next section).
The encoder functions for X and Y , (EX and EY respectively) are given as:
EX : (XK1 ,XK2)× IMkX → IM ′X = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
X − 1}
IM ′CX = {0, 1, . . . ,
M ′CX − 1} (5.26)
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kX , kY
XˆK , Yˆ K
Encoder Encoder
Decoder
XK Y K
XK1 XK2 Y K1 Y K2
Wiretapper
Figure 5.2: Shannon cipher system for two correlated sources with wiretapped source
symbols
EY : (YK1 ,YK2)× IMkY → IM ′Y = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
Y − 1}
IM ′CY = {0, 1, . . . , (5.27)
M ′CY − 1} (5.28)
The decoder is defined as:
DXY : (IM ′X , IM
′
Y
, IM ′CX , IM
′
CY
) × IMkX , IMkY
→ XK × YK (5.29)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
W1 = FEX (X
K1 , XK2 ,WkX) (5.30)
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W2 = FEY (Y
K1 , Y K2 ,WkY ) (5.31)
X̂K = FDX (W1,W2,WkX) (5.32)
Ŷ K = FDY (W1,W2,WkY ) (5.33)
or
(X̂K , Ŷ K) = FDXY (W1,W2,WkX ,WkY ) (5.34)
The following conditions should be satisfied for cases 1- 4:
1
K
logMX ≤ RX +  (5.35)
1
K
logMY ≤ RY +  (5.36)
1
K
logMkX ≤ RX +  (5.37)
1
K
logMkY ≤ RkY +  (5.38)
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Pr{X̂K 6= XK} ≤  (5.39)
Pr{Ŷ K 6= Y K} ≤  (5.40)
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2) ≤ hX +  (5.41)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hY +  (5.42)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  (5.43)
where RX is the rate of source X’s channel and RY is the rate of source Y ’s channel.
Here, (RkX , RkY ) is the rate of the key channel when allocating a key to X and Y .
The security level for X and Y are measured by the total and individual uncertainties,
(hX , hY ).
The cases 1 - 3 are:
Case 1: When (W1,W2, Y
K2) is leaked and (XK , Y K) needs to be kept secret. The
security level of concern is represented by 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2, Y K2).
Case 2: When (W1,W2, Y
K2) is leaked and (XK , Y K) needs to be kept secret. The secu-
rity level of concern is represented by ( 1KH(X
K |W1,W2, Y K2), 1KH(Y K |W1,W2, Y K2)).
Case 3: When (W1,W2, Y
K2) is leaked and Y K needs to be kept secret.The security
level of concern is represented by 1KH(Y
K |W1,W2, Y K2).
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The admissible rate region for each case is defined as follows:
Definition 1a: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1 if there exists a code
(FEX , FDXY ) such that (5.35) - (5.40) and (5.43) hold for any  → 0 and sufficiently
large K.
Definition 1b: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2 if there exists a
code (FEY , FDXY ) such that (5.35) - (5.42) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1c: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3 if there exists a code
(FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY , FDXY ) such that (5.35) - (5.40) and (5.42) hold for any → 0
and sufficiently large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions of Rj for case j are defined as:
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1} (5.44)
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2} (5.45)
R3(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3} (5.46)
Theorems for these regions have been developed:
Chapter 5. Information Leakage of Slepian-Wolf Encoded Sequences for Two
Correlated Sources with Partially Predetermined Information 93
Theorem 4: For 0 ≤ hXY ≤ H(X,Y )− µC − µY and
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y ) and
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY } (5.47)
Theorem 5: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X)− µC and 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− µC − µY ,
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y ) and
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY )} (5.48)
where R1 and R2 are the regions for cases 1 and 2 respectively.
Here, the wiretapped source symbols are indicated by the following entropy: 1K2H(Y
K2) =
µC + µY , where µC and µY are the common and private portions of the i.i.d source Y
that are contained in Y K2 per symbol. Here, YK2 is proportional to K. When hX = 0
then case 3 can be reduced to that in (5.48). Hence Corollary 2 follows:
Corollary 2 : For 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− µC − µY , R3(hY ) = R2(0, hY )
The code achieving these bounds for case 2 allows for the key length of hY to be achieved
across Y ’s channel in case 3. The security levels, which are measured by the individ-
ual uncertainties (hX , hY ) and total uncertainty hXY give an indication of the level of
uncertainty in knowing certain information. When the uncertainty increases then less
information is known to an eavesdropper and there is a higher level of security. The
direct and converse parts of the proofs for Theorem 4 (5.47) and Theorem 5 (5.48) are
contained within Appendix B.
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5.3 Information Leakage for the System using Matrix Par-
titions
The setup (G matrix, H matrix and syndromes) for this section is the same as that for
the implementation for the two correlated source model presented in Section 4.5. Here
K2 has a length specified as K2 ≤ K. The Hamming distance is represented as follows:
dH(X
K , Y K) ≤ 1.
The method specified in Section 4.5 is applied here. The leakage due to (TX , TY ) has been
detailed in Section 4.5 and here the leaked Y K2 portion may be considered separately
thereby forming a solution for the following cases:
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY , Y K2) is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TX , Y K2) is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TY , Y K2) is leaked
The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when K2 bits of source Y is leaked is considered.
First, since dH(X
K , Y K) ≤ 1, if there are 0 < K2 ≤ K bits, the number of possible
sequences including repeated sequences is 2K−K2(K + 1). For each K2 bits wiretapped,
there are K2+1 possible combinations that have a Hamming distance of one. Therefore,
the information leakage due to Y K2 with respect to XK is detailed in (5.49).
LX
K
Y K2 = K2 −
K −K2 + 1
K + 1
log2
K −K2 + 1
K + 1
−
K2∑
i=1
1
K + 1
log2
1
K + 1
(5.49)
where K = 7.
The results obtained for this scenario in (5.49) are presented in Figure 5.3. It is seen
that the maximum information leakage of YK2 on X
K is the four bits representing the
common information between XK and Y K .
For the leakage of Y K2 with respect to Y K , it is given by K2. This is depicted in Figure
5.4. The combination of this quantity (eliminating the common information) and that in
(5.49) result in the information leakage on (XK , Y K) when Y K2 has been leaked. With
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Figure 5.3: The information leakage on XK when Y K2 has been wiretapped
use of the Venn diagram above it is seen that the information leakage on (XK , Y K)
reduces to Y K2 . This means that for example, if Y K2 is two bits then there are two bits
known about (XK , Y K). Figure 5.5 shows the numerical results.
The information leakage represented here may be used in the cases specified in this
section to separately determine the information leakage of Y K2 on XK and Y K .
The chapter described a novel two correlated source model where some source informa-
tion has been leaked to a wiretapper. The security aspects for this model have been
analyzed in terms of the Slepian-Wolf scenario and Shannon’s cipher system. The infor-
mation leakage bounds and rate regions for perfect secrecy have been provided based on
the analysis of the security aspects. The chapter ends with the coding implementation
for the novel model presented here, which is an important contribution as highlighted
at the beginning of this chapter.
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Figure 5.4: The information leakage on Y K when Y K2 has been wiretapped
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Figure 5.5: The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when Y K2 has been wiretapped
Chapter 6
Information Leakage for
Correlated Sources using
Heterogeneous Encoding Method
This chapter describes a novel correlated source scenario in which two encoding methods
are investigated; the novel model is referred to as a model with a heterogeneous encoded
method. It caters for applications where a source has been leaked to a wiretapper. A
main contribution is the development of the heterogeneous encoding correlated source
model. The two approaches explored to investigate the information leakage have been
used here; one quantifying the information leakage for the Slepian-Wolf scenario and
the other incorporating Shannon’s cipher system. These security aspects of the two
correlated source model is also a contribution. The chapter again ends with a section
showing the coding implementation for this model, which is an important contribution
as it shows practical implementation for the novel model developed and provides an
important link between the information theory and coding theory fields.
6.1 Correlated Source Model for Heterogeneous Encoding
Method
The scenario has also been presented in terms of this model description and the imple-
mentation below [63]. The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X, Y and
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Z are mutually correlated random variables, depicted in Figure 6.1. The alphabet sets
for sources X, Y and Z are represented by X , Y and Z respectively. Assume that XK
and Y K are encoded into two channel information portions represented by their common
and private information portions. Here, TX = (VCX , VX) and TY = (VCY , VY ) where
TX and TY are the channel information of X and Y respectively. The Venn diagram in
Figure 6.2 illustrates this idea. Each source is composed of K bits, and for source ZK ,
µ of these symbols are considered as the wiretapped information and is leaked to the
wiretapper (µ ≤ K).
XKZK
Zµ
XˆK , Yˆ K
Decoder
k
Wiretapper
Y K
Encoder Encoder
TX TY
Figure 6.1: Correlated source coding for three sources with X and Y transmitting
compressed information
VX VY
X Y
Z
VCX VCY
Figure 6.2: The relation between private and common information
The correlated sources X, Y and Z transmit messages (in the form of some channel
information) to the receiver along the wiretapped links. The eavesdropper has access
to either the common or private portions given by TX and TY and the predetermined
information from the source Z, i.e. Zµ. As with the model in Chapter 5, the effect is
that the eavesdropper has access to some compressed information (that is transmitted
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across the communication link after encoding) and some uncompressed information (i.e.
the data symbols from source Z).
Here, for XK and Y K the typical set encoding and decoding described in Chapter 4 is
used. As a summary, it is possible to determine bin indices for the typical sequence from
the indices passed over the communication channel. When common or private informa-
tion from the syndromes are wiretapped it gives an indication of which row/column in
the specific look up table the sequence is contained within.
The code described in this section satisfies the following inequalities for δ > 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Pr{X 6= G(VX , VCX)} ≤ δ (6.1)
Pr{Y 6= G(VY , VCY )} ≤ δ (6.2)
From the Venn diagram we see the private information and common information pro-
duced by each source should contain almost no redundancy. Here, (VCX , VX , VY , VCY )
are asymptotically disjoint, which ensures that there is almost no redundant information
sent to the decoder.
Here, the nature of codes when there are three correlated sources is explored. The
correlation occurs as follows: dH(X
K , Y K) ≤ 1 and dH(Y K , ZK) ≤ 1. This means X
and Y have a Hamming distance of one and Y and Z have a Hamming distance of one.
There is therefore some sort of correlation between X and Z as they are both correlated
to Y .
The prototype code is initially defined: for any 0 ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K, there exits
a code WCX = FCX(X
K), WCY = FCY (Y
K), X̂K , Ŷ K , where WX ∈ IMX , WY ∈ IMY ,
WCX ∈ IMCX and WCY ∈ IMCY for IMα , which is defined as {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}, that
satisfies,
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Pr{X̂K , Ŷ K , ẐK 6= XK , Y K , ZK} ≤  (6.3)
H(X|Y, Z)− 0 ≤ 1
K
logMX ≤ H(X|Y, Z) + 0 (6.4)
H(Y |X,Z)− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WY ) ≤ 1
K
logMY
≤ H(Y |X) + 0 (6.5)
H(Z|X,Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
logMZ ≤ H(Z|X,Y ) + 0 (6.6)
I(X;Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
log[H(WCX) +H(WCY )]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 0 (6.7)
1
K
H(XK |VY , VZ) ≥ H(X)− 0 (6.8)
1
K
H(Y K |VX , VZ) ≥ H(Y )− 0 (6.9)
1
K
H(ZK |VZ , VY ) ≥ H(Z)− 0 (6.10)
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We can see that (6.3) - (6.7) mean
H(X,Y )− 30 ≤ 1
K
(H(VX) +H(VCX) +H(WY )
+ H(WCY )) ≤ H(X,Y ) + 30
+ 30 (6.11)
Hence from (6.3), (6.11) and the ordinary source coding theorem, (WX , WY , WCX
and WCY ) have almost no redundancy for sufficiently small 0 ≥ 0. The encoding and
decoding defined by the existence of the prototype code provided by (6.3) - (6.11) have
been proven in Chapter 4 for two sources.
This model can cater for a scenario where a particular source, say Y needs to be more
secure than X (possibly because of more eavesdropping on the Y channel); we would
need to secure the information that could be compromised. This masking approach is
described in Chapter 4.
In order to determine the security of the system, a measure for the amount of information
leaked has been developed. The obtained information and total uncertainty are used
to determine the leaked information. Information leakage is indicated using the LPQ
notation described in Chapter 4.
The information leakage bound for the following two cases are considered:
Case 1: Leakage on Y when (TX , TY , Z
µ) are wiretapped.
Case 2: Leakage on X when (TX , TY , Z
µ) are wiretapped.
The information leakage for these cases is as follows:
LY
K
TX ,TY ,Zµ
≤ I(TY ;Y K) + I(TX ;Y K)
+ I(TY ;TX |Y ) + I(Y K ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|Y K)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|Y K , TY )− I(TX ;TY )− I(TX ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX) + 2δ (6.12)
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LY
K
TX ,TY ,Zµ
≤ I(TY ;X) + I(X;TX)
+ I(TY ;TX |X) + I(X;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|X)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|Y, TY )− I(TX ;TY )− I(Zµ;TX)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX) + 2δ (6.13)
Here, TX and TY are the compressed sequences and in terms of the information quantity
they include either the private or common portion. Thus, we can see the above bound
as a generalized result for wiretapping X’s or Y ’s links, when µ bits of the source Z is
leaked. The portion Zµ could be leaked with respect to source X or Y .
This bound developed in (6.12) is proven below.
Proof for (6.12): First, H(Y K |TY , TX , Zµ) is determined as the information leakage
is found using H(Y )−H(Y |TY , TX , Zµ).
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H(Y |TY , TX , Zµ)
= H(Y, TY , TX , Z
µ)−H(TY , TX , Zµ)
(a)
= H(Y K) +H(TY |Y ) +H(TX |TY , Y )
+ H(Zµ|Y K , TY , TX)− [H(TY ) +H(TX |TY )
+ H(Zµ|TY , TX)]
(b)
= H(Y K) + [H(TY )− I(TY ;Y )] + [H(TX − I(Y ;TX)
− I(TY ;TX |Y )] + [H(Zµ)− I(Y ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|Y )− I(TX ;Zµ|Y, TY )]−H(TY )
− [H(TX)− I(TX ;TY )]− [H(Zµ)
− I(Zµ;TX)− I(TY ;Zµ|TX)]
(c)
= H(Y ) +H(TY )− I(TY ;Y ) +H(TX)− I(Y ;TX))
− I(TY ;TX |Y ) +H(Zµ)− I(Y ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|Y )− I(TX ;Zµ|Y, TY )−H(TY )
− H(TX) + I(TX ;TY )−H(Zµ) + I(Zµ;TX)
+ I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)
= H(Y K)− I(TY ;Y )− I(Y ;TX)
− I(TY ;TX |Y )− I(Y ;Zµ)− I(TY ;Zµ|Y )
− I(TX ;Zµ|Y, TY ) + I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX) (6.14)
where (a) results from the chain rule expansion for H(Y, TY , TX , Z
µ) and H(TY , TX , Z
µ)
and (b) results from the property that the conditional entropy is the same as the mutual
information subtracted from the total uncertainty, i.e. H(X|Y ) = H(X) − I(X;Y ).
Here, (c) is arithmetic, where the terms H(TY ), H(TX) and H(Z
µ) cancel.
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The information leakage is thus:
LY
K
TY ,TX ,Zµ
= H(Y )−H(Y K |TY , TX , Zµ)
≤ H(Y K)−H(VY )−H(VCY )−H(VCX)
− H(VCZ)−H(Y K) + I(TY ;Y ) + I(Y ;TX)
+ I(TY ;TX |Y ) + I(Y ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|Y )
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|Y, TY )− [I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)] + δ (6.15)
= I(TY ;Y ) + I(Y ;TX) + I(TY ;TX |Y )
+ I(Y ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Z
µ|Y ) + I(TX ;Zµ|Y, TY )
− I(TX ;TY )− I(Zµ;TX)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX) + 2δ (6.16)
which proves (6.12). Here, (6.15) results from (6.2).
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Proof for (6.13):
H(X|TY , TX , Zµ)
= H(X,TY , TX , Z
µ)−H(TY , TX , Zµ)
(d)
= H(X) +H(TY |XK) +H(TX |TY , X)
+ H(Zµ|XK , TY , TX)− [H(TY ) +H(TX |TY )
+ H(Zµ|TY , TX)]
(e)
= H(X) + [H(TY )− I(TY ;X)] + [H(TX − I(X;TX)
− I(TY ;TX |X)] + [H(Zµ)− I(X;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|X)− I(TX ;Zµ|X,TY )]−H(TY )
− [H(TX)− I(TX ;TY )]− [H(Zµ)
− I(Zµ;TX)− I(TY ;Zµ|TX)]
(f)
= H(X) +H(TY )− I(TY ;X) +H(TX)− I(X;TX))
− I(TY ;TX |X) +H(Zµ)− I(X;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|X)− I(TX ;Zµ|X,TY )−H(TY )
− H(TX) + I(TX ;TY )−H(Zµ) + I(Zµ;TX)
+ I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)
= H(XK)− I(TY ;X)− I(X;TX)
− I(TY ;TX |X)− I(X;Zµ)− I(TY ;Zµ|X)
− I(TX ;Zµ|X,TY ) + I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX) (6.17)
where (d) results from the chain rule expansion for H(X,TY , TX , Z
µ) and H(TY , TX , Z
µ)
and (e) results from the property that the conditional entropy is the same as the mutual
information subtracted from the total uncertainty, i.e. H(X|Y ) = H(X) − I(X;Y ).
Here, (f) is arithmetic, where the terms H(TY ), H(TX) and H(Z
µ) cancel.
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The information leakage is thus:
LXTY ,TX ,Zµ = H(X)−H(X|TY , TX , Zµ)
≤ H(X)−H(VX)−H(VCY )−H(VCX)
− H(VCZ)−H(X) + I(TY ;X) + I(X;TX)
+ I(TY ;TX |X) + I(X;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|X)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|X,TY )− [I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)] + δ (6.18)
= I(TY ;X) + I(X;TX) + I(TY ;TX |X)
+ I(X;Zµ) + I(TY ;Z
µ|X) + I(TX ;Zµ|Y, TY )
− I(TX ;TY )− I(Zµ;TX)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX) + 2δ (6.19)
which proves (6.13). Here, (6.18) results from (6.1).
This section shows the information leakage for when various portions of the channel
information and source data symbols from one source are leaked. The interesting cases
explored for (6.12) and (6.13) demonstrate that the source Z contributes to leakage for
X and Y ; this is due to the common information shared between them.
Equations (6.12) and (6.13) indicate that the information leakage is upper bounded
by the common information portions indicated. The information leakage in (6.12) and
(6.13) can be reduced if the common information portions are secured. Equations (6.12)
and (6.13) can be verified using the Venn diagram in Figure 6.2.
6.2 Shannon Cipher Approach for Correlated Sources us-
ing Heterogeneous Encoding Method
Here, Shannon’s cipher system for the heterogeneous encoding method (depicted in
Figure 6.3) is presented. The two source outputs are i.i.d random variables X and Y ,
taking on values in the finite sets X and Y. Both the transmitter and receiver have
access to the key, a random variable, independent of XK and Y K and taking values in
IMk = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Mk−1}. As before, the sources XK and Y K compute the ciphertexts
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W1 and W2, which are the result of specific encryption functions on the plaintext from
X and Y respectively. The encryption functions are invertible, thus knowing W1 and
the key, kX for X then X can be retrieved. The key for Y is represented as kY .
XKZK
Zµ
XˆK , Yˆ K
Decoder
k
Wiretapper
Y K
Encoder Encoder
W1 W2
kX , kY
kX , kY
Figure 6.3: Shannon cipher system for three correlated sources
The encoder functions for X and Y , (EX and EY respectively) are given as:
EX : XK × IMkX → IM ′X = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
X − 1}
IM ′CX = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
CX − 1} (6.20)
EY : YK × IMkY → IM ′Y = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
Y − 1}
IM ′CY = {0, 1, . . . ,M
′
CY − 1} (6.21)
The decoder is defined as:
DXY : (IM ′X , IM
′
Y
, IM ′CX , IM
′
CY
) × IMkX , IMkY
→ XK × YK (6.22)
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The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
W1 = FEX (X
K ,WkX) (6.23)
W2 = FEY (Y
K ,WkY ) (6.24)
X̂K = FDX (W1,W2,WkX) (6.25)
Ŷ K = FDY (W1,W2,WkY ) (6.26)
or
(X̂K , Ŷ K) = FDXY (W1,W2,WkX ,WkY ) (6.27)
The following conditions should be satisfied for cases 1- 4:
1
K
logMX ≤ RX +  (6.28)
1
K
logMY ≤ RY +  (6.29)
1
K
logMkX ≤ RkX +  (6.30)
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1
K
logMkY ≤ RkY +  (6.31)
Pr{X̂K 6= XK} ≤  (6.32)
Pr{Ŷ K 6= Y K} ≤  (6.33)
1
K
H(XK |W1) ≤ hX +  (6.34)
1
K
H(Y K |W2) ≤ hY +  (6.35)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  (6.36)
where RX is the rate of source X’s channel and RY is the rate of source Y ’s channel.
Here, (RkX , RkY ) is the rate of the key channel when allocating a key to X and Y .
The security level for X and Y are measured by the total and individual uncertainties,
(hX , hY ) and hXY respectively.
The cases 1 - 3 that are considered are as follows:
Case 1: When (W1,W2, Z
µ) is leaked and (XK , Y K) needs to be kept secret. The se-
curity level of concern is represented by 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2, Zµ).
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Case 2: When (W1,W2, Z
µ) is leaked and (XK , Y K) needs to be kept secret. The se-
curity level of concern is represented by ( 1KH(X
K |W1,W2, Zµ), 1KH(Y K |W1,W2, Zµ)).
Case 3: When (W1,W2, Z
µ) is leaked and Y K needs to be kept secret.The security level
of concern is represented by 1KH(Y
K |W1,W2, Zµ).
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as follows:
Definition 1a: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1 if there exists a code
(FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY , FDXY ) such that (6.28) - (6.33) and (6.36) hold for any → 0
and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2 if there exists a
code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY , FDXY ) such that (6.28) - (6.35) hold for any  → 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Definition 1c: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3 if there exists a code
(FEY , FDXY ) such that (6.28) - (6.33) and (6.35) hold for any  → 0 and sufficiently
large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions of Rj for case j are defined as:
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1} (6.37)
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2} (6.38)
R3(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3} (6.39)
Theorems for these regions have been developed:
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Theorem 6: For 0 ≤ hXY ≤ H(X,Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z),
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY } (6.40)
Theorem 7: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X)− αCX and 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− αCY ,
R2(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY )} (6.41)
where R1 and R2 are the regions for cases 1 and 2 respectively. Here, αCX and αCY are
the common portions (i.e. the correlated information) of the i.i.d source Z (for I(X;Z)
and I(Y ;Z) respectively) that are contained in Zµ per symbol.
When hX = 0 then case 3 can be reduced to that depicted in (6.41). Hence, Corollary
3 follows:
Corollary 3: For 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− αCY , R3(hY ) = R2(0, hY )
The proofs and converses of Theorems 6-7 are contained within Appendix C.
6.3 Information Leakage for the System using Matrix Par-
titions
The same setup (G matrix, H matrix and syndromes) as per the implementation in
Section 4.5 is applied to implement this model. Using the method already specified,
the information leakage for each of the following cases may be found. The leakage due
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to (TX , TY ) has been detailed in Section 4.5 and here the leaked Z
µ portion may be
considered separately, thereby forming a solution for the following cases:
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY , Zµ) is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TX , Zµ) is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TY , Zµ) is leaked
The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when µ bits of source Z is leaked is considered,
which is done in two steps. First, since dH(Y
K , ZK) ≤ 1, if there are 0 < µ ≤ K bits
(µ = 0 has been considered in Section 4.5), the number of possible sequences including
repeated sequences is 2K−µ(K+1). However, there are 2K−µ different sequences repeated
K − µ+ 1 times and there are µ2K−µ different sequences that possibly occur once.
Second, from every possible Y K , there are eight possible sequences for XK with identical
possibilities. Therefore, the information leakage due to Zµ with respect to XK and Y K
is detailed in (6.42).
LX
K ,Y K
Zµ = H(X
K , Y K) + K−µ+1K+1 log2
K−µ+1
2K−µ(K+1)
+µ2K−µ 1
2K−µ(K+1) log2
1
2K−µ(K+1) −H(XK |Y K) (6.42)
where H(XK , Y K) = 10, H(XK |Y K) = 3 and K = 7.
The numerical results retrieved using (6.42) are presented in Figure 6.4. It is seen that
the information leakage on (XK , Y K) increases as more µ bits are wiretapped and this
is because of the correlation between the sources. The maximum information that Zµ
leaks about (XK , Y K) is four bits.
The information leakage represented in (6.42) may be used in the cases explored in this
section to separately determine the information leakage of Zµ on XK and Y K . The Zµ
bits also contribute to the information leakage and the correlation between XK , Y K and
Zµ plays a role in determining the overall leakage.
This section shows the information leakage for the model described in this chapter where
various portions of the channel information and some source data symbols from Z are
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Figure 6.4: The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when Zµ has been wiretapped
leaked. Again it is noted that the message bits given by u1 and v1 also contribute to
information leakage as they are not masked in any way. If these are hidden in some way
then the information leakage will be less. In addition, due to the correlation that exists
between XK , Y K and Zµ there is leakage on XK and Y K when Zµ has been leaked.
The chapter described a novel heterogeneous encoded correlated source model where
some source information has been leaked to a wiretapper. The security aspects for this
model have been analyzed in terms of the Slepian-Wolf scenario and Shannon’s cipher
system. The information leakage bounds and rate regions for perfect secrecy have been
provided based on the analysis of the security aspects. The chapter ends with the coding
implementation for the novel model presented here, which is an important contribution
as highlighted at the beginning of this chapter.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis by initially comparing the novel correlated source
models presented in Chapters 4-6 with existing models, and detailing the future work
for this research project. Further, the contributions have been listed followed by a
description of the contents of the thesis.
7.1 Comparison to other Models
The two correlated source model across a channel with an eavesdropper is a more gen-
eralised approach of Yamamoto’s [5] model. If the links were combined into one link,
the same situation as per Yamamoto’s [5] would result. As described in the two cor-
related source model in Chapter 4 this specific model can be implemented for multiple
sources with Shannon’s cipher system. Due to the unique scenario incorporating mul-
tiple sources and multiple links, the models presented above are more secure as private
information and common information from other link/s are required for decoding.
Further, information at the sources may be more secure in the two correlated source
model presented in Chapter 4 because if one source is compromised then only one source’s
information is known. In Yamamoto’s [5] method both source’s information is contained
at one station and when that source is compromised then information about both sources
are known. The information transmitted along the channels (i.e. the syndromes) in
these models presented in Chapters 4-6 do not have a fixed length as per Yamamoto’s
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[5] method. Here, the syndrome length may vary depending on the encoding procedure
and nature of Slepian-Wolf codes.
In these novel models, information from more than one link may be required in order
to determine the information for one source. This gives rise to added security as even if
one link is wiretapped it may not be possible to determine the contents of a particular
source. This is attributed to the fact that this model transmits common information
portions from different links, which is different to Yamamoto’s model.
At first glance, Yamamoto’s model may seem to be a generalisation of the Luo et al. [47]
model, however Luo et al. [47] incorporate a wiretapper at the source that has access
to some source data symbols. In this work, Chapter 5 incorporates this concept in that
the information known to the eavesdropper is Y K2 source symbols of source Y K .
Another major feature is that private information can be hidden using common informa-
tion. Here, common information produced by a source may be used to mask its private
codeword thus saving on key length. The key allocation is specified by the general rules
presented in Chapter 4. The multiple correlated sources model presents a combination
masking scheme where more than one common information is used to protect a private
information, which is a practical approach. This is an added feature developed in or-
der to protect the system. This approach has not been considered in the other models
mentioned in this section.
The work by Yang et al. [2] uses the concept of side information to assist the decoder in
determining the transmitted message. The side information could be considered to be
a source and is related to this research when the side information is considered as cor-
related information. Similar work with side information that incorporates wiretappers,
by Villard and Piantanida [26] and Villard et al. [23] may be generalised in the sense
that side information can be considered to be a source, however these models are distin-
guishable as syndromes, which are independent of one another are transmitted across
an error free channel. Further, to the author’s knowledge Shannon’s cipher system has
not been incorporated into these models by Villard and Piantanida [26] and Villard et
al. [23].
It is noted that the models presented in this thesis reduce to Yamamoto’s model. Here,
when the variations in the models presented in Chapters 5 and 6 (two correlated sources
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with some source information wiretapped and the heterogeneous model respectively) are
removed it reduces to the two correlated source model presented in Chapter 4. When the
two correlated sources become one source transmitting information across a single link
then the model further reduces to that of Yamamoto’s. This thesis therefore incorporates
models that build on Yamamoto’s model.
7.2 Future Work
This research project has room future work. It would be interesting to consider the
case where the channel capacity has certain constraints (according to the assumptions
in Chapter 4 the channel capacity is enough at all times). In the two correlated source
models, the channels are either protected by keys or not however this is limited and a
real case scenario where there are varying security levels for the channels is an avenue
for future work.
7.3 Contributions
This thesis contributes the following:
• Information leakage quantification for two correlated source models (Sections 4.2
and 5.1)
• Shannon cipher approach for two correlated source models (Sections 4.4 annd 5.2)
• Information leakage quantification for heterogeneous encoding method correlated
source model (Section 6.1)
• Shannon cipher approach for heterogeneous encoding method correlated source
model (Section 6.2)
• Coding implementation for the various correlated source models developed (Sec-
tions 4.5, 5.3 and 6.3).
The contributions listed above are to the author’s knowledge novel. There has been much
work conducted in this field of security for correlated sources, which has been detailed in
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the literature review. The field of information theory took off with Shannon’s model for a
communication system [15], where the concept of entropy was introduced. The research
after this important paper related to correlated sources and security aspects of wiretap
networks has been described in Chapter 2. The techniques and methodologies presented
in Chapter 3 gave an overview of the concepts, theorems and techniques utilized for
the research. These include those developed for use by the Slepian-Wolf theorem, the
wiretap channel and coding implementation for correlated sources. Initially a generalized
model for correlated sources is presented where the information leakage is described and
thereafter the Shannon cipher system approach is presented. These security aspects are
presented for each of the correlated source models thereafter; In Chapters 4-5, where two
correlated source models are presented and in Chapter 6 where a heterogeneous encoding
method correlated source model is presented. The implementation for these models are
also presented. The implementation uses a matrix partition method and is significant
because it provides a link between information theory and coding theory. The correlated
source models contained herein are for applications where there is existence of common
information in communication networks (two correlated source model), there exists some
predetermined information (two correlated source model with some source data symbols
wiretapped), where a source is more prone to wiretapper access (heterogeneous encoding
method correlated source model).
The use of correlated sources in communication networks is major as can be seen by the
applications detailed in Chapters 1-2. Based on this research significant steps can be
taken to advance in the field of security for correlated sources (in the broader field of
information theory). The literature survey provides evidence that this research has not
been conducted before and to the author’s knowledge the contributions are novel.
This chapter presents a conclusion for the research project. The novel models presented
have been compared to existing models and the future work has been described. This
is followed by a list of the contributions and a summary of the details of the thesis.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorems 2-3
This section proves the direct parts of Theorems 2 - 3 and thereafter the converse
parts. Before the theorems are proved it is necessary to develop the prototype code
(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ). Proofs of Theorems 4-7 covered in Appendix B and C also
make use of this code.
All the channel rates in the theorems above are in accordance with Slepian-Wolf’s the-
orem, hence there is no need to prove them. A code based on the prototype code
(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ) in Lemma 1 is constructed. In order to include a key in the
prototype code, WX is divided into two parts as per the method used by Yamamoto [5]:
WX1 = WX mod MX1 ∈ IMX1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX1 − 1} (A.1)
WX2 =
WX −WX1
MX1
∈ IMX2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX2 − 1} (A.2)
where MX1 is a given integer and MX2 is the ceiling of MX/MX1. The MX/MX1 is
considered an integer for simplicity, because the difference between the ceiling value and
the actual value can be ignored when K is sufficiently large. In the same way, WY is
divided:
118
Appendix A. Proofs for Theorems 2-3 119
WY 1 = WY mod MY 1 ∈ IMY 1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 1 − 1} (A.3)
WY 2 =
WY −WY 1
MY 1
∈ IMY 2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 2 − 1} (A.4)
The common information components WCX and WCY are already portions and are not
divided further. In this scenario WCX + WCY lie between 0 and I(X;Y ). It can be
represented by X and Y , X only or Y only. It can be shown that when some of the
codewords are wiretapped the uncertainties of XK and Y K are bounded as follows:
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WY ) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − ′0 (A.5)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − ′0 (A.6)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y )− ′0 (A.7)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (A.8)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (A.9)
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1
K
H(XK |WY ,WCY ) ≥ H(X|Y ) + 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (A.10)
1
K
H(Y K |WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (A.11)
where 
′
0 → 0 as 0 → 0. The proofs for (A.5) - (A.11) are the same as per Yamamoto’s [5]
proof in Lemma A1. The difference is that WCX , WCY , MCX and MCY are described
as WC1, WC2, MC1 and MC2 respectively by Yamamoto. Here, WCX and WCY is
considered to be represented by Yamamoto’s WC1 and WC2 respectively. In addition
there are some more inequalities considered here:
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ,WY 2) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
− ′0 (A.12)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 − ′0 (A.13)
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMX1
+
1
K
logMCX − ′0 (A.14)
1
K
H(Y K |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 +
1
K
logMCX
− ′0 (A.15)
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The inequalities (A.12) and (A.13) can be proven in the same way as per Yamamoto’s[5]
Lemma A2, and (A.14) and (A.15) can be proven in the same way as per Yamamoto’s[5]
Lemma A1.
A.1 Direct parts
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that (RX , RY , RKX , RKY ) ∈ R1 for hXY ≤ H(X,Y ).
Then, Theorem 2 is as follows:
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (A.16)
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY (A.17)
Here the keys are uniform random numbers. For the first case, consider the following:
hXY > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2
KH(X|Y ), 2K(hXY −I(X;Y ))) (A.18)
MY 1 = 2
K(hXY −I(X;Y )) (A.19)
The codewords W1 and W2 and the key WkXand WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (A.20)
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W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (A.21)
WkX = WkCX (A.22)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (A.23)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know WX1, WCX WY 1
and WCY as these are protected by keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (4.15) - (4.17) and (A.16) - (A.23),
that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (A.24)
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1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− 0 (A.25)
= hXY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (A.26)
where (A.25) results from (A.19).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY )
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2)− ′′0 (A.27)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX ,WY 2)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − ′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− ′0 − 
′′
0
= hXY − ′0 − 
′′
0 (A.28)
where (A.27) holds because WCX and WCY are covered by uniform random keys and
the result of Yamamoto’s Lemma A2.
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from (A.24) - (A.28).
Next the case where: hXY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The codewords and keys are now
defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (A.29)
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W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (A.30)
WkX = (WkCX) (A.31)
MCX = 2
KhXY (A.32)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hXY
≤ RkX +RkY (A.33)
where (A.33) results from (A.32).
The security level thus results:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1,WY 2,WCY )
≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0
= hXY − ′0 (A.34)
≥ hXY − ′0 (A.35)
where (A.34) holds from (A.32).
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Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from (A.29) - (A.71).
Theorem 3 proof. In the same way as Theorem 2, suppose that (RX , RY , RkX , RkY )
∈ R2 for hX ≤ H(X) and hY ≤ H(Y ). Without loss of generality, we assume that
hX ≤ hY . Then resulting from Theorem 3,
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (A.36)
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY ) (A.37)
Consider the following: hX > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2
KH(X|Y ), 2K(hY −I(X;Y ))) (A.38)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (A.39)
The codeword W2 and the key WkY is now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (A.40)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (A.41)
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WkX = WkCX (A.42)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (A.43)
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (4.15) - (4.17) and (A.38) - (A.43),
that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (A.44)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (A.45)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (A.46)
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY )
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1 (A.47)
WY 2)− ′′0
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX2,WY 2)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − ′′0
= I(X;Y ) + min(2KH(X|Y ), 2hY −I(X;Y ))− ′′0
≥ hY − ′′0
≥ hX (A.48)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1 ⊕WkX1,
WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2
WCY ⊕WkCY )
≥ 1
K
logMY 1 + I(X;Y )− ′′0
= I(X;Y ) + min(H(X|Y ),
hY − I(X;Y ))− ′′0 (A.49)
≥ hY (A.50)
where (A.49) comes from (A.39).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible from (A.44) - (A.50).
Next the case where hX ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. If hY > I(X;Y ) the following results.
The codewords W1 and W2 and their keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
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W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (A.51)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (A.52)
WkX = WkCX (A.53)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (A.54)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (A.55)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
[logMCX + logMY 1 + logMCY ]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − 0
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (A.56)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY + 0 (A.57)
where (A.56) results from (A.55).
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,
WCY ⊕WkCY )
≥ I(X;Y )− ′0 (A.58)
= I(X;Y )− ′0 (A.59)
≥ hX − ′0 (A.60)
where (A.59) results from (A.55).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,
WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY )
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − 0 (A.61)
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− ′0 (A.62)
≥ hY − ′0 (A.63)
where (A.62) holds from (A.55).
Next the case where hY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The codewords W1 and W2 and their
keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (A.64)
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W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (A.65)
WkX = WkCX (A.66)
MCX = 2
KhY (A.67)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hY (A.68)
≤ RkX +RkY (A.69)
where (A.68) results from (A.67).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,WCY )
=
1
K
logMCY
≥ hY (A.70)
≥ hX (A.71)
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where (A.70) results from (A.67).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,WCY )
=
1
K
logMCY (A.72)
≥ hY (A.73)
where (A.72) holds from (A.67).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for min(hX , hY ) (A.64) - (A.73).
A.2 Converse parts
From Slepian-Wolf’s theorem it is known that the channel rate must satisfy RX ≥
H(X|Y ), RY ≥ H(Y |X) and RX + RY ≥ H(X,Y ) to achieve a low error probability
when decoding. Hence, only the key rates are considered in this subsection.
Converse part of Theorem 2:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX|W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W1)]− 
=
1
K
H(WkX |XK , Y K ,W1) + I(WkX ;W1)
+ I(WkX ;X|Y,W1) + I(X,Y,WkX |W1)
+ I(Y,WkX |X,W1)− I(WkX ;W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W1)−H(XK , Y K |W1,WkX)]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(X,Y |W1,WkX)− 2 (A.74)
= hXY −H(VCY )− 2
= hXY − 2 (A.75)
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where (A.74) results from equation 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  as described in
Chapter 4. Here, the extremes of H(VCY ) are considered in order to determine the limit
for RkX . When this quantity is minimum then the maximum bound of hXY can be
achieved.
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W2)]− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |XK , Y K ,W2) + I(WkY ;W2)
+ I(WkY ;X|Y,W2) + I(X,Y,WkY |W2)
+ I(Y,WkY |X,W2)− I(WkY ;W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W2)−H(XK , Y K |W2,WkY )]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W2,WkY )− 2 (A.76)
= hXY −H(VCX)− 2
= hXY − 2 (A.77)
where (A.76) results from equation 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  as described in
Chapter 4. Here, the extremes of H(VCX) are considered in order to determine the limit
for RkY . When this quantity is minimum the maximum bound of hXY can be achieved.
Appendix A. Proofs for Theorems 2-3 133
Converse part of Theorem 3:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX|W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W1)]− 
=
1
K
H(WkX |XK ,W1) + I(WkX ;W1)
+ I(X,WkX |W1)− I(WkX ;W1)− 
≥ 1
K
I(XK ,WkX |W1)− 
=
1
K
[H(XK |W1)−H(XK |W1,WkX)]− 
≥ hX −H(VCY )− 2 (A.78)
= hX − 2 (A.79)
where (A.78) results from 1KH(X
K |W1) ≤ hX +  described in Chapter 4. Here, the
extremes of H(VCY ) are considered in order to determine the limit for RkX . When this
quantity is minimum the maximum bound of hX can be achieved.
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W2)]− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |Y K ,W2) + I(WkY ;W2)
+ I(X,WkY |W2)− I(WkY ;W2)− 
≥ 1
K
I(Y K ,WkY |W2)− 
=
1
K
[H(Y K |W2)−H(Y K |W2,WkY )]− 
≥ hY −H(VCX)− 2 (A.80)
= hY − 2 (A.81)
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where (A.80) results from 1KH(Y
K |W2) ≤ hY +  described in Chapter 4. Here, the
extremes of H(VCX) are considered in order to determine the limit for RkY . When this
quantity is minimum then the maximum bound of hY can be achieved.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorems 4-5
B.1 Direct parts
The prototype code (WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY that has been described in Chapter 4 and
Appendix A is applied here.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that (RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) ∈ R1 for hXY ≤ H(X,Y ) −
µC − µY . Without loss of generality, hXY ≤ RkX +RkY is assumed. Then, from (5.47)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (B.1)
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY (B.2)
Here the keys are uniform random numbers. For the first case, consider the following:
hXY > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2
KH(X|Y ), 2K(hXY −I(X;Y ))) (B.3)
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MY 1 = 2
K(hXY −I(X;Y )) (B.4)
The codewords W1 and W2 and the key WkX and WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (B.5)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (B.6)
WkX = WkCX (B.7)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (B.8)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know WX1, WCX , WY 1
and WCY as these are protected by keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (B.1) - (B.8), that
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1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (B.9)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− 0 (B.10)
= hXY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (B.11)
where (B.30) results from (B.4).
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Y K2)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2, Y K2)− ′′0 (B.12)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX ,WY 2, Y K2)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− µC − µY − 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− µC − µY
− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= hXY − µC − µY − 2′0 − 
′′
0 (B.13)
where (B.12) holds because WCX and WCY are covered by uniform random keys and
the result of Yamamoto’s Lemma A2.
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from (B.9) - (B.13).
Next the case where: hXY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The codewords and keys are now
defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (B.14)
W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (B.15)
WkX = (WkCX) (B.16)
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MCX = 2
KhXY (B.17)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
(logMkX + logMkY ) =
1
K
logMCX
= hXY
≤ RkX +RkY (B.18)
where (B.18) results from (B.17).
The security level thus results:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Y K2) = 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1,WY 2,WCY , Y
K2)
≥ 1
K
logMCX − µC − 2′0
= hXY − µC − 2′0 (B.19)
≥ hXY − 2′0 (B.20)
where (B.44) holds from (B.17).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from (B.14) - (B.20).
Proof of Theorem 5. In the same way as Theorem 4, suppose that (RX , RY , RkX , RkY )
∈ R2 for hX ≤ H(X) − µC and hY ≤ H(Y ) − µC − µY . Without loss of generality,
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hX ≤ hY and hX + hY ≤ RkX +RkY are assumed. Then, from (5.48)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (B.21)
max((hX , hY ) ≤ RkX +RkY (B.22)
Consider the following: hX > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2
KH(X|Y ), 2K(hY −I(X;Y ))) (B.23)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (B.24)
The codeword W2 and the key WkY is now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (B.25)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (B.26)
WkX = WkCX (B.27)
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WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (B.28)
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (B.23) - (B.28), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X) + I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (B.29)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (B.30)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (B.31)
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2, Y K2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1 (B.32)
WY 2, Y
K2)− ′′0
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX2,WY 2, Y K2)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − µC − 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + min(2KH(X|Y ), 2hY −I(X;Y ))
− µC − 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hY − µC − 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hX (B.33)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1 ⊕WkX1,
WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2
WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ 1
K
logMY 1 + I(X;Y )− µC − µY − ′0
= I(X;Y ) + min(H(X|Y ), hY − I(X;Y ))
− µC − µY − ′0 (B.34)
≥ hY − ′0 (B.35)
where (B.34) comes from (B.24).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible from (B.29) - (B.35).
Next the case where hX ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. If hY > I(X;Y ) the following results.
The codewords W1 and W2 and their keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
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W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (B.36)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (B.37)
WkX = (WkCX) (B.38)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (B.39)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (B.40)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
[logMCX + logMY 1 + logMCY ]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − 0
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (B.41)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY + 0 (B.42)
where (B.41) results from (B.40).
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,
WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ I(X;Y )− µC − ′0 (B.43)
= I(X;Y )− µC − ′0 (B.44)
≥ hX − ′0 (B.45)
where (B.44) results from (B.40).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,
WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− µC − µY − 0 (B.46)
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )
− µC − µY − ′0 (B.47)
≥ hY − ′0 (B.48)
where (B.47) holds from (B.40).
Next the case where hY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The codewords W1 and W2 and their
keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (B.49)
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W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (B.50)
WkX = WkCX (B.51)
MCX = 2
KhY (B.52)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hY (B.53)
≤ RkX +RkY (B.54)
where (B.53) results from (B.52).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Y
K2)
≥ hY − µC − ′0 (B.55)
≥ hX − ′0 (B.56)
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where (B.55) results from (B.52).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Y
K2)
≥ hY − µC − µY − 0 (B.57)
≥ hY − ′0 (B.58)
where (B.57) holds from (B.52).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for min(hX , hY ) from (B.49) -
(B.58).
B.2 Converse parts
From Slepian-Wolf’s theorem it is known that the channel rate must satisfy RX ≥
H(X|Y ), RY ≥ H(Y |X) and RX + RY ≥ H(X,Y ) to achieve a low error probability
when decoding. Hence, only the key rates are considered in this subsection.
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Converse part of Theorem 4:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkX |XK , Y K ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(WkX ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkX |W )
+ I(Y,WkX |X,W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)−  (B.59)
= hXY − 1
K
H(Y K |XK)− µC − − ′′0
≥ hXY − µC − − ′′0 (B.60)
where W = (W1,W2, Y
K2) are the wiretapped portions, (B.59) results from equation
(5.43). Here, the extremes of H(Y |X) and H(WY ) are considered in order to determine
the limit for RkX . When this quantity is minimum then the maximum bound of hXY
can be achieved.
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RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |X,Y,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(WkY ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkY |W )
+ I(Y,WkY |X,W )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )−  (B.61)
= hXY − 1
K
H(XK |Y K)− µC − µY − − ′′0
≥ hXY − µC − µY − − ′′0 (B.62)
where (B.61) results from equation (5.43). Here, the extremes of H(X|Y ) are considered
in order to determine the limit for RkY . When this quantity is minimum then the
maximum bound of hXY can be achieved.
Converse part of Theorem 5:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H((WkX |XK ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(X,WkX |W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(XK ,WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK |W )−H(XK |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hX −H(WCY )− µC − − ′′0 (B.63)
≥ hX − µC − − ′′0 (B.64)
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where W = (W1,W2), (B.63) results from (5.41). Here, the extremes of H(WCY ) are
considered in order to determine the limit for RkX . When this quantity is minimum
then the maximum bound of hX can be achieved.
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |Y K ,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(X,WkY |W )− I(WkY ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(Y K ,WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(Y K |W )−H(Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hY −H(WCX)− µC − µY − − ′′0 (B.65)
≥ hY − µC − µY − − ′′0 (B.66)
where (B.65) results from (5.42). The same consideration as above for H(Y K2) is pre-
sented here. Here, the extremes of H(WCX) are considered in order to determine the
limit for RkY . When this quantity is minimum the maximum bound of hY can be
achieved.
Appendix C
Proof of Theorems 6-7
This section initially proves the direct parts of Theorems 6 - 7 and thereafter the converse
parts.
C.1 Direct parts
The prototype code (WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ) described in Chapter 4 and Appendix A is
applied here.
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose that (RX , RY , RKX , RKY ) ∈ R1 for hXY ≤ H(X,Y ) −
αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z). Then, from (6.40)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (C.1)
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY (C.2)
Here the keys are uniform random numbers. For the first case, consider the following:
hXY > I(X;Y ).
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MX1 = min(2
KH(X|Y ), 2K(hXY −I(X;Y ))) (C.3)
MY 1 = 2
K(hXY −I(X;Y )) (C.4)
The codewords W1 and W2 and the key WkXand WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (C.5)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (C.6)
WkX = WkCX (C.7)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (C.8)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know WX1, WCX WY 1
and WCY as these are protected by keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (C.1) - (C.8), that
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1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (C.9)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− 0 (C.10)
= hXY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (C.11)
where (C.10) results from (C.4).
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Zµ)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2)− ′′0 (C.12)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX ,WY 2, Zµ)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0 (C.13)
where (C.12) holds because WCX and WCY are covered by uniform random keys and
the result of Yamamoto’s Lemma A2.
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from (C.9) - (C.13).
Next the case where: hXY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The codewords and keys are now
defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (C.14)
W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (C.15)
WkX = (WkCX) (C.16)
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MCX = 2
KhXY (C.17)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hXY
≤ RkX +RkY (C.18)
where (C.18) results from (C.17).
The security level thus results:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Zµ) = 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1,WY 2,WCY , Z
µ)
≥ 1
K
logMCX − αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0
= hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− ′0 (C.19)
where (C.19) holds from (C.17).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from (C.14) - (C.19).
Theorem 7 proof. In the same way as Theorem 6, suppose that (RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) ∈
R2 for hX ≤ H(X)−αCX−αCY +I(X;Y ;Z) and hY ≤ H(Y )−αCX−αCY +I(X;Y ;Z).
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Without loss of generality, we assume that hX ≤ hY . Then, from (6.41)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (C.20)
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY ) (C.21)
Consider the following: hX > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2
KH(X|Y ), 2K(hY −I(X;Y ))) (C.22)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (C.23)
The codeword W2 and the key WkY is now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (C.24)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (C.25)
WkX = WkCX (C.26)
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WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (C.27)
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (C.22) - (C.27), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (C.28)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (C.29)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (C.30)
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2, Zµ)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1 (C.31)
WY 2, Z
µ)− ′′0
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX2,WY 2, Zµ)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
(C.32)
− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + min(2KH(X|Y ), 2hY −I(X;Y ))
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hX (C.33)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1 ⊕WkX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ 1
K
logMY 1 + I(X;Y )− αCX
− αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0
= I(X;Y ) + min(H(X|Y ), hY − I(X;Y ))
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (C.34)
≥ hY − ′0 (C.35)
where (C.34) comes from (C.23).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible from (C.28) - (C.35).
Next the case where hX ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. If hY > I(X;Y ) the following results.
The codewords W1 and W2 and their keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
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W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (C.36)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (C.37)
WkX = (WkCX) (C.38)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (C.39)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (C.40)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
[logMCX + logMY 1 + logMCY ]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − 0
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (C.41)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY + 0 (C.42)
where (C.41) results from (C.40).
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The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,
WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ I(X;Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (C.43)
= I(X;Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (C.44)
≥ hX − ′0 (C.45)
where (C.44) results from (C.40).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,
WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 0 (C.46)
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (C.47)
≥ hY − ′0 (C.48)
where (C.47) holds from (C.40).
Next the case where hY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The codewords W1 and W2 and their
keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (C.49)
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W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (C.50)
WkX = WkCX (C.51)
MCX = 2
KhY (C.52)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper will not know the WX and WY
that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hY (C.53)
≤ RkX +RkY (C.54)
where (C.53) results from (C.52).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2, Zµ)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,WCY , Zµ)
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (C.55)
≥ hX − ′0 (C.56)
where (C.55) results from (C.52).
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1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2, Zµ) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Z
µ)
≥ 1
K
logMCY − αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (C.57)
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z) (C.58)
where (C.57) holds from (C.52).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for min(hX , hY ) from (C.49) -
(C.58).
C.2 Converse parts
From Slepian-Wolf’s theorem it is known that the channel rate must satisfy RX ≥
H(X|Y ), RY ≥ H(Y |X) and RX + RY ≥ H(X,Y ) to achieve a low error probability
when decoding. Hence, only the key rates are considered in this subsection.
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Converse part of Theorem 6:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkX |XK , Y K ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(WkX ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkX |W )
+ I(Y,WkX |X,W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)−  (C.59)
= hXY − 1
K
H(Y K |XK)− αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0
≥ hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (C.60)
where W = (W1,W2, Z
µ) are the wiretapped portions, (C.59) results from equation
(6.36). Here, the extremes of H(Y |X) and H(WY ) are considered in order to determine
the limit for RkX . When this quantity is minimum then the maximum bound of hXY
can be achieved.
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RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |X,Y,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(WkY ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkY |W )
+ I(Y,WkY |X,W )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )−  (C.61)
= hXY − 1
K
H(XK |Y K)− αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0
≥ hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (C.62)
where (C.61) results from equation (6.36). Here, the extremes of H(VCX) are considered
in order to determine the limit for RkY . When this quantity is minimum then the
maximum bound of hXY can be achieved.
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Converse part of Theorem 7:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H((WkX |XK ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(X,WkX |W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(XK ,WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK |W )−H(XK |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hX −H(WCY )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− − ′′0 (C.63)
≥ hX − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (C.64)
where W = (W1,W2, Z
µ), (C.63) results from (6.34). Here, the extremes of H(WCY )
are considered in order to determine the limit for RkX . When this quantity is minimum
then the maximum bound of hX can be achieved.
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RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |Y K ,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(X,WkY |W )− I(WkY ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(Y K ,WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(Y K |W )−H(Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hY −H(WCX)− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− − ′′0 (C.65)
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (C.66)
where (C.65) results from (6.35). The same consideration as above for H(Zµ) is pre-
sented here. Here, the extremes of H(WCX) are considered in order to determine the
limit for RkY . When this quantity is minimum then the maximum bound of hY can be
achieved.
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